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[1365] 
Revoking Rights 
Craig J. Konnoth* 
In important areas of law, such as the vested rights doctrine, and in several important 
cases—including those involving the continued validity of same-sex marriages and the 
Affordable Care Act—courts have scrutinized the revocation of rights once granted more 
closely than the failure to provide the rights in the first place. This project claims that in so 
doing, courts seek to preserve important constitutional interests. On the one hand, based 
on our understanding of rights possession, rights revocation implicates autonomy 
interests of the rights holder to a greater degree than a failure to afford rights at the outset. 
On the other hand, the institution revoking rights is more likely to exhibit impermissible 
behavior when taking away rather than failing to provide the right. 
 
This is the first of two articles, and tackles the first of the project’s claims. It examines the 
autonomy interests of the rights holder that are implicated in rights revocation. It relies on 
philosophical understandings of ownership, backed by empirical research, to argue that 
our identities and indeed, our ability to think of ourselves as separate beings apart from 
the collective, are partially based on what we possess at a given point in time. The rights 
we possess both allow us to do things that aid in our flourishing and allow us to conceive 
of ourselves as individuals. Important legal concepts, such as the vested rights doctrine, 
among others, rely on this understanding of rights. 
 
However, the notion of rights, possession, and revocation are all constructed and subject 
to contestation. Courts and other institutional actors often face adversaries making 
(conflicting) rights claims. They must determine when a change in rights allocation is a 
rights revocation or a restoration of the status quo ante. In taking sides, courts and 
legislatures adopt rights revocation/restoration frames, claiming that the winners have 
rights that are being restored, and that losers never had rights to begin with, or that their 
rights existed temporarily subject to correction. In so doing, institutional actors also shore 
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up their own legitimacy, often at the cost of each other. This dynamic provides an insight, 
not just into the work that rights do in constructing individuals, but also in developing 
institutional legitimacy. It shows how institutions themselves exploit rights claims in order 
to—consciously or not—further their own agendas. 
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Introduction 
Can the government take away rights or benefits from individuals or 
entities once they have been granted? In recent cases involving hot 
button issues such as same-sex marriage litigation as well as Medicaid 
expansion and in more mundane welfare or child custody cases, courts and 
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advocates have argued that in certain situations, the answer is no. Their 
reasoning relies on a long history of judicial hostility to rights revocation. 
This Article contends that this hostility is based on an understanding that 
already endowed rights are embedded in, connected to, and constitute 
individuals or entities—their personhood and identities—in a way that 
rights that have yet to be granted are not. Taking away previously granted 
rights fundamentally alters the nature of the existence and identity of the 
individual or entity, and must therefore be closely scrutinized. Given this 
understanding, the battle often shifts to the question of what a right is, or 
what should be understood as a revocation—questions that are subject to 
social, legal, and political contestation, the consequences of which often 
determine the outcome in these cases. 
This understanding of endowed rights as deeply shaping one’s 
identity and being has deep roots, both philosophical and empirical, as 
Part I explains. The philosophical account proceeds in two different ways. 
On the one hand, we exercise rights we possess to develop our personhood. 
On the other hand, these rights are part of who we are, shaping our sense 
of self. These claims are empirically supported by phenomena that 
developmental and behavioral psychologists refer to as self-anchoring and 
the endowment effect. I call this the “connectedness” account of rights 
ownership to distinguish it from other concepts of ownership that do not 
depend upon the connection between the individual and the property or 
right. 
Part II turns to legal concepts and doctrines that have long reflected 
this connectedness account. As Part II.A explains, since the earliest uses 
of the word “rights” to denote subjective faculties, legal concepts have 
treated rights as connected to and constitutive of one’s being. Now 
largely defunct legal doctrines, such as “vesting,” corruption of blood, 
attainder, and forfeiture, captured and relied on this idea that rights in 
property are connected to and embedded in an individual. The most 
important of these legal doctrines, however, is the vested rights doctrine. 
Part II.B, therefore, turns to and examines the vested rights doctrine 
in some depth. The vested rights doctrine prohibits or otherwise limits 
the revocation of certain existing rights, usually in contract and property. 
As this Subpart shows, the various doctrinal elements of the vested rights 
doctrine that measure the length of time a right was possessed, the 
reliance on the right, and the formalities that accompanied the genesis of 
the right, all ultimately seek to investigate how connected the right is to 
the personhood and life of the owner. When a right has reached a certain 
level of connection, it cannot be revoked. 
A mainstay of constitutional litigation in the nineteenth century, the 
doctrine was rarely invoked after the passage of the Reconstruction 
Amendments except in specialized areas of litigation involving, for example, 
zoning and pensions. The doctrine has recently moved back into the 
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mainstream as marriage equality advocates have heavily relied on it to 
prevent revocation of same-sex marriage rights. In these cases, courts 
have invalidated same-sex marriage bans.1 Most of these courts stayed 
the rulings pending appeal. However, in certain jurisdictions—Utah, 
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Indiana—injunctions requiring the states to 
recognize same-sex marriage went into effect immediately, and some 
time lapsed before they were stayed by higher courts.2 During this time, 
numerous couples married.3 These states argue that they need not 
recognize those marriages. Couples that have married claim that because 
their marriage rights vested upon the granting of the marriage license, 
they cannot be “strip[ped]” or “taken away” from the couples; thus, they 
sought preliminary injunctions requiring the recognition of their 
marriages.4 These cases will remain active no matter the result in the 
marriage litigation currently before the Supreme Court.5 Even if the 
Supreme Court ultimately holds that the Constitution provides marriage 
equality rights, the concerns regarding the financial and other losses that 
these couples have suffered in the interim because their states have 
refused to recognize their marriage rights will remain live.6 Thus, Part 
II.B concludes with a closer examination of these cases. 
But courts do not necessarily rely on formal constitutional doctrines 
when they resist rights revocation.7 In the welfare arena, for example, the 
Court introduced procedural safeguards only for rights revocation without 
ever invoking the vested rights doctrine. Similarly, in the Affordable Care 
Act case, only one issue garnered agreement among a supermajority of the 
Supreme Court’s Justices: although Congress was not obliged to provide 
Medicaid funding to states in the first place, once provided, the threat to 
withdraw this funding was problematic.8 Again, while the Justices did not 
invoke the vested rights doctrine, connectedness-based concerns best 
 
 1. See Marriage Litigation, Freedom to Marry, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation (last 
visited June 9, 2015). 
 2. See Herbert v. Evans, 135 S. Ct. 16 (2014) (granting stay of the district court’s decision to issue 
a preliminary injunction “pending final disposition of the appeal”); Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 4, Caspar v. Snyder, No. 14-cv-11499, 2015 WL 224741 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2015) [hereinafter 
Motion]. 
 3. See Motion, supra note 2, at 1. 
 4. Motion for and Memor[an]d[u]m in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 18, Evans v. Utah, 21 
F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1198 (D. Utah 2014) (No. 2:14-CV55-DAK) [hereinafter Motion & Memorandum]; 
Motion, supra note 2, at 18. 
 5. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-556) (argued 
Apr. 28, 2015). 
 6. See, e.g., Motion & Memorandum, supra note 4, at 9–16 (describing financial and emotional 
harms); Motion, supra note 2, at 6–7 (describing payments plaintiffs have had to make in the interim 
because employer’s insurance would not cover spouse as long as the state did not recognize the marriage). 
 7. For simplicity’s sake, I use “rights revocation” also to refer to revocation of the broader 
panoply of liberties, privileges, and benefits that an individual possesses. 
 8. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–07 (2012). 
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explain the Court’s approach, as this Article explains in Part II.C. In all 
these cases, what was at stake was the deprivation of a core right or set of 
benefits, around which the legal and personal identity of the individual or 
entity was constructed. Courts therefore were skeptical of the revocation 
of these rights and benefits. 
This Article’s account of hostility to rights revocation is based on 
solicitude toward rights holders: courts seek to protect the personhood 
interests and connectedness of the rights holders, no matter what institution 
is revoking the right. But another reason courts have resisted rights 
revocation is to police the intent or behavior of the rights revokers, no 
matter the effect of the revocation on the rights holder. Courts (claim to) 
more easily detect animus, arbitrariness, or other improper motivation 
when these institutions take away already-granted rights than when they 
deny rights at the outset. The Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of California’s 
Proposition 8, which took away same-sex couples’ right to marry, is one 
such example.9 Similarly, before the 2012 election, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the Ohio legislature’s retraction of early voting in the weekend before 
the elections for everyone except military voters was impermissible: 
“[W]here the State has authorized in-person early voting through the 
Monday before Election Day for all voters, ‘the State may not, by later 
arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of 
another.’”10 I save these questions for another article.11 
Nonetheless, cases like Perry v. Schwarzenegger12 and similar 
institutional-policing cases make a cameo in this Article as well. Like the 
vested rights, welfare, and Affordable Act cases, they present more 
universal questions that cannot be deferred. What is this metaphysical 
thing we call a right? And more importantly, what does it mean to take it 
away? Litigants and social movements are constantly at work, framing 
different interests as rights and claiming that a redistribution results in 
“revocation.” The Proposition 8 proponents, for example, claimed that 
they were merely “restoring” the right to “define marriage”; gay activists 
protested the loss of a right to marry, and claimed that the proponents were 
 
 9. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated on jurisdictional grounds by 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).  
 10. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 888 F. Supp. 2d 897, 910 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (citing Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000)), aff’d, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit essentially “embraced 
[the district court’s] reasoning.” Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1836, 1845 (2013). Other scholars have referred, in passing, to the retrogression 
principle apparent in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion. See id. at 1844, 1846; Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 
Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1865, 
1880–82 (2013).  
 11. See Craig Konnoth, Reasoning in Rights Revocation Cases: Policing Institutional Roles (Sept. 
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Cases that appear in the follow-up article include 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), and Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 12. 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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restoring nothing, but rather, taking away a right. Framing an interest an 
individual has in doing something (for example, “defining marriage”) as a 
legal right helps establish a sense of connection with the interest that one 
may not feel to another, arbitrarily held interest. Thus, plaintiffs and 
other actors seek to frame their claims using rights language to drum up 
support both within their movement and from governmental actors. This 
in turn affects their sense of who they are, their preferences, and the claims 
they advance. Courts and other state actors, in turn, will frame the claim 
of the winning side as a “right.” 
In the long run, courts and legislatures themselves seek to tap into 
the power of the revocation/restoration frame to shore up their own 
legitimacy. On this account, the language of revocation and restoration is 
used not just to legitimize plaintiffs’ claims to a right, but also the power 
of courts themselves. Courts frame the winners as rights holders, thus 
suggesting that they themselves are rights restorers, remedying revocations 
by other institutional actors, such as legislatures. Legislatures may respond 
by painting courts as taking away rights improperly, and in turn, claim the 
mantle of rights restorers, passing legislation that “restores” the rights that 
courts took away. The narrative of “rolling back” rights is therefore subject 
to contestation. The notion of what a right is and whether that right is 
possessed in the first place is part of a broader jurisgenerative struggle. 
This struggle does not nullify the doctrinal categories through which 
constitutional rights are analyzed, nor the power of the rights rollback 
narrative; rather, the fact that movements and governmental institutions 
struggle over these categories is both evidence of, and further reifies 
their power in, our legal discourse. 
It bears noting that both the connectedness- and institutional-
policing accounts of rights reversal are novel. Despite the commonality 
of the practice, few scholars have examined, and none have explained, 
judicial disfavor of rights reversal. Those that consider rights reversal as 
an independent matter generally dismiss the phenomenon as essentially 
policymaking from the bench.13 In their 1998 article, John Jeffries and 
Daryl Levinson consider then-recent constitutional cases, which they argue 
exhibited a “non-retrogression principle,” and assert that such a principle 
constitutes no more than judicial policymaking.14 Cass Sunstein, in his 
earlier work culminating in The Partial Constitution, also points to a “status 
quo bias” in constitutional (and other areas of) law, which result in courts’ 
treating any revocation that causes a deviation from the status quo with 
hostility.15 As relevant to the problem here, Sunstein treats the status quo 
 
 13. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 45–46 (1993); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & 
Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 1211, 
1220 (1998). I engage Sunstein’s work with greater depth later in this Article. See infra Part IV. 
 14. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 13, at 1220. 
 15. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 168. 
K - Konnoth_18 (ONLINE) (Do Not Delete) 6/22/2015 9:49 PM 
1372 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1365 
bias as the product of policy preferences as opposed to one serving 
constitutional interests. Hence, he argues, deliberative democracy must 
engage in constructing those preferences in a just manner.16 
Given this lacuna, the other natural place to which one may turn to 
explain aversion to rights revocation is the literature on the vested rights 
doctrine. While the vested rights doctrine is one among the several sets of 
doctrines and approaches in Part II that reflects a connectedness account 
of rights holding, it is the only one of these doctrines that has enjoyed 
sustained contemporary scholarly and judicial attention. However, 
scholarship on vested rights is scarcely more enlightening. Indeed, some 
have despaired of explaining why, upon the vesting of a right, it cannot 
be revoked, even if it need not have been granted in the first place.17 
Those that are more optimistic provide two dominant accounts, neither 
of which can easily be extrapolated to the question of why courts dislike 
rights revocation outside the vested rights context, and both of which 
seem incomplete. 
First, according to some, vested rights are based on constitutionally 
unenumerated natural law principles and are often coupled with and 
treated as the precursors to substantive due process. Edward Corwin, 
John Ely, and James Kainen all make variations of this argument.18 Larry 
 
 16. Id. The question this Article deals with is analytically independent of the question of 
constitutional baselines. A constitutional baseline—either descriptive or normative—discusses what rights 
are or should be in a given situation. While that is an important question (and, as I demonstrate in the 
final Part, related to the question I deal with here), it is an independent one from the one that I deal with 
at least in the first two Parts of this Article. My thesis in Parts I–II is that courts’ discomfort with rights 
revocation is independent of the fact that the Constitution may mandate the granting of that right in the 
first place (that is, set a baseline). There is something about the perception that a right is being revoked 
that animates the courts to protect the right more urgently than they otherwise would based solely on the 
constitutional command that the right be granted. The final Part recognizes the importance of baselines, 
but argues that it is the framings of revocation and restoration that affect what we see of as a baseline in 
the first place, rather than the other way around as commentators seem to have argued. See, e.g., Seth F. 
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1293, 1352 (1984) (“[T]he distinction between liberty-expanding offers and liberty-reducing threats turns 
on the establishment of an acceptable baseline against which to measure a person’s position after imposition 
of an allocation.”). I therefore do not directly engage with the large literature on constitutional baselines 
more generally. See generally Larry Alexander, Understanding Constitutional Rights in a World of 
Optional Baselines, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 175 (1989). 
 17. They therefore concluded that all retroactivity should be constitutional. See, e.g., Michael J. 
Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1820, 1822 (1986) (noting his previous contribution 
that all changes in the law have an economic impact on the value of existing assets); Louis Kaplow, An 
Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 512 (1986) (arguing that governmental 
policy changes affect reliance interests, similar to changes in the market; thus, it is better to rely on the 
market than on transition relief); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium 
Approach, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1069–73 (1997) (explaining that retroactivity is an indeterminate 
concept, better understood as a range of temporal options rather than a binary construct); id. at 1079 
(“[M]ost new rules impose some retroactive effects [, which] undermines the claim that retroactive 
legislation necessarily violates the Due Process or Takings Clauses.”). 
 18. See generally Edward Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War (pts. 
1 & 2), 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 460 (1911); Edward Corwin, The Extension of Judicial Review in New York: 
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Tribe similarly argues that vested rights theory was a precursor to the 
flowering of natural rights ideas developed through substantive due 
process.19 Under a second account, Michael McConnell and Nathan 
Chapman are the latest in a series of scholars to argue that the vested 
rights doctrine concerns separation of powers—courts used the doctrine 
to invalidate what they considered to be legislative imposition of a judicial 
sentence.20 As Marbury v. Madison itself teaches us, “The question whether 
a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by 
the judicial authority.”21 Vested rights, on this account, are those property 
rights that can only be taken away by due process of law, pursuant to 
judicial decree. 
Both accounts are deficient. Vested rights are not natural rights in 
the same way as fundamental rights (under substantive due process). An 
ex ante denial of a fundamental right is just as bad as ex post deprivation 
of the right; but the vested rights doctrine penalizes only deprivations, not 
denials, of the right. The separation of powers explanation, in turn, is also 
limited because it simply begs the question: if vested rights are those 
rights that require judicial intervention to be divested, we still need an 
explanation why these rights require judicial intervention.22 Further, there 
 
1783–1905, 15 Mich. L. Rev. 281–313 (1917); Laura Inglis, Substantive Due Process: Continuation of 
Vested Rights?, 52 Am. J. Legal Hist. 459 (2012); James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving 
Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 87, 114 (1994) 
(“Vesting became a question of substantive justice rather than legal definition . . .”). Another explanation 
that I categorize in a similar vein is that of John Hardin Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of 
Judicial Review 14–21, 73–75 (1980). Ely claims that judges differentiate vested rights from substantive 
due process rights because the former derive their authority from positive law, and the latter from natural 
law. Id. They both represent approaches to rights protections that are fashioned after the legal 
philosophies of their day. 
 19. Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 415–34 (1978). 
 20. See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672 (2012). Others are of the same school of thought, at least with respect to 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive 
Due Process Clause, 120 Yale L.J. 408, 411–12 (2010). 
 21. 5 U.S. 137, 167 (1803). 
 22. John Harrison makes a similar point. John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the 
Constitutional Text, 83 Va. L. Rev. 493, 522 (1997). Chapman and McConnell begin to provide this 
explanation, arguing that rules that divest property rights in a manner that are not both general and 
prospective require judicial intervention. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 20, at 1677–79. Yet, 
there are three problems with this explanation. First, (to their credit) they also point to several cases 
where courts invalidated seemingly “general” property divestments. Id. at 1718, 1751; see, e.g., Hoke v. 
Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1, 15–16 (1833) (any holder of a certain office divested of the office); 
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (all holders of a certain grant of land divested of the 
land). Although Chapman and McConnell frame these as general divestments of property, I do not think 
that these cases can be lumped together with situations in which the legislature targets a particular 
individual to take away her property in particular, without due process of law—Chapman and 
McConnell’s archetypal example. Second, the approach fails to sufficiently cabin courts rather capacious 
definition of property during this period. See Kainen, supra note 18. Third, even if courts considered whether 
the taking was general and retroactive, Chapman & McConnell provide no conceptual explanation as 
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is reason to doubt that lack of judicial oversight was the sole reason for 
invalidating revocations of vested rights—even revocations with judicial 
process were sometimes viewed with suspicion. Indeed, contemporary 
thinkers, including numerous Framers, felt that even judicial process could 
not deprive certain rights once bestowed.23 This suggests that the problem 
with taking away vested rights, in some situations, at least, was less that 
the wrong branch took away the right, but rather that there is something 
about certain vested rights that prevents any branch of the government 
from taking the rights away at all. Suggesting that vested rights are vested 
because they are identified with the judicial power puts the cart before the 
horse: heightened judicial protections for vested rights exist because of 
their vestedness, but these protections do not define what vestedness is. As 
Ann Woolhandler puts it, “the separation of powers concerns underlying” 
vested rights and related doctrines “can only be applied by taking into 
account the substantive rights at issue.”24 Thus, for what Corwin referred 
 
to why these considerations are important, and require due process (nor were they required to, given 
their primarily historical approach). 
 23. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and Its 
Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1390 (1992). 
 24. Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 Geo. L.J. 
1015, 1019 (2006). Woolhandler, the only scholar I have identified to attempt a systematic treatment, 
draws a distinction between “private” and “public” rights. Id. For her, a “positively derived, traditional 
property that results from one’s labor and voluntary exchange” can be distinguished from, and “more 
securely protects individuals from the state than . . . statutory entitlements.” Id. at 1061–62. As she 
explains, “the public/private line distinguishes between statutory and common law rights, making the 
former easier to abrogate than the latter.” Id. at 1060. Woolhandler admits that her thesis is more 
descriptive than prescriptive: she justifies the line by noting that “we have in the past and continue to 
provide more protection for traditional common law interests.” Id. at 1061; see also Stephen F. Williams, 
Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. Legal Stud. 3, 11–12 (1983) (arguing 
that judicial protection of traditional property rights serves as an external check on encroachment by 
nonjudicial branches of government). Although Woolhandler’s distinction has merit—and appears to 
have been one of the animating concerns behind the judicial distinction between public and private 
rights, it could not have been the only one. Woolhandler does not consider antebellum cases such as 
Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1, in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina invalidated the 
legislature’s attempt to divest an individual of a government office in which, the court found, he had a 
vested interest. Yet, this was a deprivation of a public rather than a private benefit. Indeed, in 
Marbury itself, the Supreme Court held that a public office was a vested right. 5 U.S. at 162. Similarly, 
although corporation charters slowly became treated as private property, in pre-nineteenth century 
thought, corporation charters were considered public privileges. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding 
the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings” 
Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 67–68 (1987) (citing cases). Yet, even then, many argued that 
these charters constituted vested rights. Id. at 68–69. The complicated history of these charters, as Siegel 
reminds us, challenges the easy distinction between private and public rights. Id. The distinction between 
private and public rights is, and remains, complicated. Indeed, it seems almost conclusory to claim that 
a right is “public,” and therefore not worthy of protection, versus “private.” Other rights apart from 
charter rights, most notably pensions, have a similar, changeable history—transforming from a matter 
of privilege to one of right, from public to private, nonvested to vested, depending on historical 
circumstances. Just what those circumstances are that produce the public and private distinction remains 
to be determined. 
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to as “the basic doctrine of American constitutional law,”25 the vested rights 
doctrine has, remarkably, eluded philosophical and historical explanation. 
Three caveats merit attention before proceeding. First, I refrain 
from making prescriptive claims as to what claims should be, or are, rights, 
or whether courts are right in resisting revocation. Rather, any interest 
has the potential to be framed as a right, depending upon what the social, 
political, and legal context will reasonably accommodate. As a general 
matter, the claims of this Article are descriptive rather than prescriptive, 
and indeed, the final Part describes the contingent and constructed nature 
of both rights and the concept of revocation. Second, courts permit (most) 
rights to be taken away with enough process. I do not consider here why 
that is.26 Finally, this Article is only the first half of a larger story. As I 
note above, a follow up Article explains that in several cases, including 
Perry, the courts penalize rights revocation to police the institutions 
revoking rights, invoking equality and other principles, rather than relying 
directly on the harms caused to rights holders.27 
I.  Rights Ownership as Connectedness 
Hostility to rights revocation relies on the understanding that owning 
a right connects the right to, and embeds the right in, the individual. Under 
this account of ownership as connectedness, ownership represents a 
philosophical and psychological connection between an individual and 
the right. As discussed later in this Part, this is not the only, or even (in 
the Fourteenth Amendment context) the dominant modern account of 
rights ownership. Nor do I suggest that it is a better account of rights 
ownership than any other. However, it explains, as I shall later argue, the 
greater solicitude certain legal doctrines exhibit to already owned rights. 
Before proceeding, one may notice that throughout the Introduction, 
and for the remainder of this Article but most noticeably in this Part, I 
slip between individuals’ connection to objects and their connection to 
rights. Two reasons justify this approach. First, property scholars and 
historians have long argued that our concept of rights as subjective faculties, 
the ability to engage in certain activities, is bound up in our concept of 
 
  Andrea L. Peterson suggests in passing that another approach is to draw a clear distinction 
based on whether “when it first granted the right at issue to A, the government reserved the power to modify 
or eliminate that right. In other words, the government gave the right to A with strings attached.” Andrea 
L. Peterson. The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I—A Critique of Current Takings 
Clause Doctrine, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 1299, 1349–50 (1989). But as Siegel’s work suggests, this distinction is 
not tenable given that, starting in the late nineteenth century, courts always implied strings in government 
grants. Siegel, supra, at 33–35. 
 25. Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 247, 
247 (1914). 
 26. For a literature review on the subject, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The 
Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 885 (1981). 
 27. See Konnoth, supra note 11. 
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property as a historical and philosophical matter.28 Thus, it would be 
unsurprising for the philosophical and psychological conception of property 
ownership to cross over into rights ownership as well. Second, more 
importantly, and perhaps because of the first point, when one speaks of 
property or ownership, one is more properly talking about certain rights 
with respect to an object. Thus, to suggest that “property” becomes bound 
up in an individual is often shorthand for saying that the individual 
becomes attached to certain rights with respect to the object, including 
possession and certain kinds of uses. Thus, there is no principled reason for 
restricting a connectedness account to physical objects—as much as 
objects, the ability to exercise certain rights similarly can become bound 
up with an individual. Accordingly, courts and scholars, many on whom I 
rely on below, also slip between discussing possession of objects and rights, 
particularly in the vested rights context as discussed in the following Part.29 
I should note that in providing this account of rights ownership I do 
not give a full exposition of how a right is developed. That explanation 
must wait until Part III. Until then, a right is best understood as a set of 
capabilities that is recognized by the positive law of a jurisdiction. Of course, 
not all capabilities are rights and not all rights are deeply embedded in 
personhood because of the factors described in greater depth in Part II.B 
 
 28. Thus, Carol Rose notes, “[P]roperty analogies have a way of creeping into people’s talk about 
all kinds of rights.” Carol M. Rose, Propter Honoris Respectum: Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 329, 348 (1996). Indeed, property for some “is the symbolic means through which 
people convey and receive the meaning of all rights.” Id. at 349. As an example, she gestures to a journal 
article by James Madison in which he describes as his property his religious beliefs, reputation, and other, 
more abstract possessions. Id. at 348–49 (citing James Madison, Property, Nat’l Gazette, Mar. 27, 
1792, reprinted in 14 The Papers of James Madison, 6 April 1791–16 March 1793, at 266 (Robert A. 
Rutland et al. eds., 1983)). Rose notes that some may be troubled by this slippage, partially because of 
a broader critique of rights rhetoric and property rhetoric that is beyond the scope of this Article. Id. 
at 350 (citing Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 44–47 (1991) (using the 
example of Native Americans to illustrate the partiality and injustice of property definitions)). Another 
reason to fear the slippage is the commodification thesis that Margaret Jane Radin discusses in Market-
Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1852–53 (1987). However, here I am, if anything, focusing on 
the non-commodified personhood values of property, which should not implicate commodification 
concerns. While critiques of this slippage exist, they are beyond the scope of this Article.  
  Richard Tuck, in his canonical history of the development of theories of natural rights, 
similarly notes that a theory of natural rights developed from concepts of property. Richard Tuck, 
Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development 3 (1979). Early in the history of natural 
rights theory, “to have a right was to be the lord or dominus of one’s relevant moral world, to possess 
dominium, that is to say, property.” Id. (emphasis in original). Similarly, as a matter of constitutional 
law, there was a “reconceptualization of the legal concept of property to include all legally protected 
interests” as a result of Hofeldian legal analysis. James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations 
of the Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State, 
31 Buff. L. Rev. 381, 444 (1982). 
 29. Kathleen Sullivan relies on a similar metaphor. Sullivan has argued that certain rights should 
similarly be inalienable, and that “some attributes are so closely connected to the person that their alienation 
would injure personal identity.” See Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 
1413, 1485 (1989). Just as different types of property are important to personhood to different degrees, 
so too would Sullivan “rank different constitutional rights as more or less central to personal identity.” Id.  
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and II.C. But when advocates understand a specific capability to be an 
embedded right, they may believe and claim that it should not be easily 
revoked. Depending on whether their claim is recognized by the State, their 
claims will either be vindicated or fail. Thus, as explained more fully in Part 
III, there is no one account on what is an embedded right; rather, multiple 
constituents advance claims as to what should be an embedded right with 
varying degrees of success.  
A. Embedded Rights 
When something is owned it transforms personhood in a way that 
something that is yet to be owned does not. Philosophers and political 
theorists since at least John Locke identify a deep bond between owning 
rights in property and personhood. Scholars have developed these claims 
in two ways. First, some concentrate on the instrumental value of rights 
in developing personhood—being able to use one’s property, skills, 
resources, or other abilities helps develop one’s identity overall. Others, 
however, go further, and argue that certain rights, when deployed in a 
certain manner, become constitutive of personhood. That is, the very 
being of the individual becomes infused with the right, the exercise of 
which helps, in part, to define the person. 
Margaret Radin embraces both approaches. Her famous psycho-
philosophical account first relies on an instrumental view of property to 
develop personhood. Focusing on objects, she concludes that, “to achieve 
proper self-development—to be a person—an individual needs some 
control over resources in the external environment.”30 Similarly, Jedidiah 
Purdy argues that harnessing one’s resources to perform tasks, such as 
volunteering, is linked to human flourishing and self-realization because 
of the “moral satisfaction” individuals get from participating in such 
projects.31 Under this account, time, skill, and talent are forms of property, 
and individuals can utilize their ownership interests in these resources to 
develop their personhood.  
However, possessing a right and deploying it as a means to develop 
personhood is different from saying that personhood is constituted by 
and infused in the right itself. For example, I may use my property interest 
in a bus ticket to go to church, therefore “using it” in some way to engage 
in personal development, but I would never claim that my personality 
was somehow constructed through or infused in the bus ticket. 
Nevertheless, numerous theorists claim that in some cases, personhood 
becomes infused in the property and vice versa. Sartre observed that “[t]he 
totality of my possessions reflects the totality of my being. I am what I 
 
 30. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 957 (1982). 
 31. Jedediah Purdy, The Meaning of Property: Freedom, Community, and the Legal 
Imagination 150–51 (2010). 
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have . . . . What is mine is myself.”32 Hegel referred to property as “the 
existence of [my] personality.”33 And for Locke, upon a man’s mixing the 
“[l]abour of his [b]ody” with possessions, they become “properly his.”34 
Thus, by joining the property to “something that is his own” (his body and 
labor) the property becomes “a part of him, that another can no longer have 
any right to.”35 Similarly, in explaining how an individual obtains property 
interests through adverse possession, Oliver Wendell Holmes explained, 
[T]he notion of property . . . is in the nature of man’s mind. A thing 
which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether 
property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn 
away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, 
however you came by it.36 
Radin provides both a philosophical and psychological explanation 
for this understanding: possessing property is a precondition of conceiving 
of an individual in the first place—property is what permits an individual 
to project herself into the future or the past; it is required to populate 
one’s memory with substance.37 Indeed, even more fundamentally, to 
comprehend oneself as a person, one must differentiate and delineate 
one’s body and mind from the collective. Rights in one’s body and mind 
allow an individual to develop the self in order to achieve this task. It is 
the rights to certain objects that allow one to think of oneself as a continuing 
entity through time that is able to perform certain actions. Accordingly, as 
Radin explains, “persons [are] continuing self-consciousness characterized 
by memory [that] . . . is made of relationships with other people and the 
world of objects.”38 Thus, an individual’s personhood is embodied or 
constituted, at least in part, “in terms of ‘things,” and “[m]ost people 
possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves. These 
objects are closely bound up with personhood because they are part of 
the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the 
world.”39 
In experiments that have received little attention in the legal 
literature,40 developmental psychologists have found empirical support 
for Radin’s philosophical thesis that individuals have a psychological 
 
 32. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology 
591–92 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., Philosophical Library, Inc. 1956) (1943). 
 33. G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right § 51, at 81 (Allen Wood ed., H.B. 
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1820) (emphasis added). 
 34. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 287–88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988) (1690). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 477 (1897) (emphasis added). 
 37. See generally Radin, supra note 30. 
 38. Id. at 967. 
 39. Id. at 958–59. 
 40. One exception is a passing reference by Nestor M. Davidson in Property and Identity: Vulnerability 
and Insecurity in the Housing Crisis, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 119, 133 (2012). 
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connection with, and conceive of themselves through, their rights.41 As 
these experiments have found, individuals perceive a link between 
themselves and their property in both an intellectual and affective 
manner; they feel and believe that the target of ownership is theirs. 
Further, there is an affective or emotional sensation that accompanies 
this state. Depending on the context, individuals emphasize an affective 
sense of ownership—a “feeling” of ownership—or cognitive ownership—
an intellectual understanding that they own the object.42 
Research in this area centers around the concept of self-anchoring—
the idea that when something is associated with the self, one’s affective 
attitude or emotional outlook toward it is reflected from or “anchored” 
by that which one holds toward oneself. As recent research reveals, 
owned objects are anchored in oneself and therefore judgments of owned 
objects correspond to judgments of self to a greater extent than that of 
unowned objects. Thus, in one recent experiment, researchers discovered, 
using implicit association testing, that (1) choosing an object was sufficient 
to create an affective link between the object and the individual—testing 
revealed that the object would be linked to words denoting oneself; (2) 
objects that were chosen were evaluated differently than objects that 
were rejected; and (3) evaluations of objects that were chosen mirrored 
evaluations of self-esteem.43 Thus, “[a]ssociative self-anchoring can be 
understood as the formation of an association between an object and the 
self, leading to a subsequent transfer of already existing self-associations 
to the object.”44 
Developing these relationships with property or rights helps serve 
various functions. Jon Pierce, one of the foremost cognitive psychologists 
who write on the topic, has performed a meta-analysis of studies of the 
functions ownership serves. He concludes that a sense of ownership of 
rights in something (not necessarily tangible) helps individuals obtain a 
sense of potency and control by being able to affect their environment.45 
As one writer observes, to the extent the degree of control resembles 
that which an individual feels for her body, it contributes to a sense of 
efficacy.46 Consumer research shows that47 possession also helps establish 
 
 41. Jon L. Pierce & Iiro Jussila, Psychological Ownership and the Organizational Context: 
Theory, Research, Evidence, and Application 16, 19 (2011); see generally Leon Litwinski, The 
Psychology of “Mine,” 22 Phil. 240 (1947). 
 42. Linn Van Dyne & Jon L. Pierce, Psychological Ownership and Feelings of Possession: Three Field 
Studies Predicting Employee Attitudes and Organizational Citizenship Behavior, 25 J. Organizational 
Behav. 439, 442 (2004). 
 43. See generally Bertram Gawronski et al., I Like It, Because I Like Myself: Associative Self-Anchoring 
and Post-Decisional Change of Implicit Evaluations, 43 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 221 (2006).  
 44. Id. at 223–24. 
 45. Pierce & Jussila, supra note 41, at 39–40. 
 46. Lita Furby, Possessions: Toward a Theory of their Meaning and Function Throughout the Life 
Cycle, 1 Life-Span Dev. & Behav. 297, 322–23 (P. B. Baltes ed., 1978). 
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identity, allowing individuals to express themselves and communicate 
their self-perception to society.48 Identities and social roles are formed 
through narratives. In these “self-narratives, consumers play out their 
identities as a kind of performance on the stage of life, with products as 
props in the enactment of personalized version of cultural script.”49 
Further, individuals absorb meaning from the objects they possess—as 
most midlife crises would suggest, they ascribe to themselves meanings 
that society may attach to the objects they own.50 Future expectations and 
narratives regarding objects are important to developing a sense of self 
and even of identity.51 
But even more than answering the identity-related question of who 
one is, connections to property help prove that one is, that is, that one 
exists as an independent human being separate from the collective. As 
some scholars explain using theories borrowed from developmental 
psychology, the concept of ownership helps children differentiate between 
self and the world.52 As they develop, they learn to separate the self from 
the rest of the world.53 As part of this process, children begin to separate 
the objects associated with themselves from the objects associated with 
others, extending these ideas over time to ownership of abstract concepts 
such as rights or intellectual property.54 Different cultural understandings 
of what can be possessed and what possession means can result in 
different ways of understanding oneself and one’s community.55 
Both Radin’s theory and empirical work show that some objects 
play a greater role in developing personhood, and some a lesser, depending 
on context. As Radin explains, “the personhood perspective generates a 
hierarchy of entitlements: the more closely connected with personhood, 
the stronger the entitlement.”56 At one end may be commercial interests 
such as the right one has in possession and alienation of money or goods 
a shop owner may hold for sale. At the other end are rights very close 
 
 47. Russell W. Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. Consumer Res. 139, 144–45 (1988); 
Banwari Mittal, I, Me, and Mine—How Products Become Consumers’ Extended Selves, 5 J. Consumer 
Behav. 550, 557 (2006). 
 48. Belk, supra note 47, at 41. 
 49. Mittal, supra note 47, at 553. 
 50. Helga Dittmar, The Social Psychology of Material Possessions: To Have Is to Be 54 (1992). 
 51. See, e.g., Aaron C. Ahuvia, Beyond the Extended Self: Loved Objects and Consumers’ Identity 
Narratives, 32 J. Consumer Res. 171, 171–72 (2005). 
 52. Leon Litwinski, Is There an Instinct of Possession, 33 British J. Psych. 28, 34 (1942). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 34. This is, for me, the best explanation of why we feel connections to objects. But the 
causes for owner-object linkages are, admittedly, debated. Some point to biological causes based on 
anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., Pierce & Jussila, supra note 41, at 34–35. Of course, others argue that a 
combination of biology and development help shape our understanding of ownership. Dittmar, supra 
note 50, at 23–34. 
 55. Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (1985). 
 56. Radin, supra note 30, at 986. 
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and personal to the individual, which range from interests in family 
heirlooms to rights in body parts and the right to certain basic freedoms, 
among others. 
What determines this “hierarchy”? Predictably, objects that are 
more entangled with our sense of identity and narrative of ourselves, our 
past and future, are more important to us. The foremost determinants are 
the degree of control over and, in Locke’s story, the investment of one’s 
own resources into, something.57 Physical proximity makes a difference: if 
“you now control” something, you are more likely to feel connected to it, 
at least at that point in time.58 Hegel in turn argued that physical 
“occupancy . . . is requisite.”59 Physical occupancy or control, however, is 
just one of several reasons an individual may feel invested in an object. 
Researchers have found that individuals can develop connections 
through a variety of narratives to intangible rights or objects. Habitual 
and constant use of a right is more likely to increase its perceived value.60 
Similarly, as we come to know something and obtain more information 
about it, the more intimate the connection between the individual and 
the thing becomes, and the more wiling we are to invest in the object.61 
Legal ownership—or perceived legal ownership62—similarly creates 
a powerful connective narrative about how the object or right plays a role 
in an individual’s life. Pierce and his co-authors explain, 
[L]egal ownership may facilitate and speed up the emergence of 
psychological ownership, because it allows the individual to explore the 
. . . routes leading to this state. . . . [The] [l]ack of legal ownership may 
in some cases provide a more precarious form of ownership, in that an 
individual has to avoid violation of the law (e.g., physical barriers, 
customs, and social practices) [in order] to exercise one or more of the 
three routes to psychological ownership. In the absence of legal ownership, 
one may also have to contend with a greater fear of separation, claim of 
ownership by the legal owner, and loss of the object.63 
This insight, that law provides an important narrative through which 
individuals understand a right as being connected to and constituting 
themselves, will prove crucial in later Parts. 
 
 57. Pierce & Jussila, supra note 41, at 122; Furby, supra note 46, at 331. 
 58. Radin, supra note 30, at 968 (emphasis added). 
 59. Hegel, supra note 33, § 51, at 81 (emphasis added). 
 60. Pierce & Jussila, supra note 41, at 79. 
 61. James K. Beggan & Ellen M. Brown, Association as a Psychological Justification for Ownership, 
128 J. Psychol. 365, 376–77 (1994). 
 62. Remember, I do not claim that the perception of an embedded right means that the state will 
recognize the right as embedded. 
 63. Jon L. Pierce et al., The State of Psychological Ownership: Integrating and Extending a Century 
of Research, 7 Rev. Gen. Psychol. 84, 96 (2003). 
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B. Taking Away Embedded Rights 
Because the self is related to or constituted by objects, obtaining 
control over a certain object means that a bond is formed, and taking 
away an item that is owned imposes a greater burden than taking away 
an item that is not owned. Few of the philosophers and social scientists 
discussed in the previous Subpart examine the question of revocation of 
the right to which the individual is connected. However, those that do, 
predict that loss of these objects we control causes a “partial annihilation 
of self.”64 Even if the object or right itself is not important, an attack on 
ownership can be understood as an attack on self-sovereignty.  
Because of the failure of connectedness theorists to focus on 
revocation, a better perspective could be gained from considering 
behavioral economics research conducted on the question of revocation 
of objects. Starting in the 1980s, behavioral economists observed that in 
many situations, individuals demanded more to give up a good they 
already owned than they were willing to give to obtain a good they did 
not yet own.65 This “endowment effect” had massive implications for 
legal theory—if it correctly predicted preferences, it could affect laws 
ranging from creditor repossession rights to employment insurance 
policies.66 Almost twelve hundred law review articles used the term 
“endowment effect” between 1990 and 2012.67 
Endowment effect research progressed independently of the 
ownership theory research discussed in the previous Subpart. While the 
connectedness theorists developed a theory of ownership but did not 
focus on questions of revocation, endowment effect empiricists observed 
the effects of revocation without developing a clear theory of ownership. 
Thus, endowment effect researchers have struggled to determine what 
causes the effect. Most scholars have traditionally associated the 
endowment effect with a psychological phenomenon they call “loss 
aversion,” according to which individuals weigh losses more heavily than 
potential gains.68 Yet, the loss aversion theory itself appears to beg the 
question why individuals value losses more than gains. The legal 
literature has also pointed to other causes for the endowment effect, but 
has strangely failed to consider a connectedness account of ownership. In 
a recent paper, Gregory Klass and Kathryn Zeiler note that the effect 
remains unexplained, and radically suggest that the effect does not exist 
because of some independent overvaluation of already endowed objects; 
 
 64. See, e.g., Belk, supra note 47, at 143. 
 65. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1228 & 
n.3 (2003). 
 66. Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and 
Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 2, 19 (2013). 
 67. Id. at 18. 
 68. Id. at 4. 
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rather, individuals claim to value endowed objects more to gain a 
bargaining advantage (when they are sellers) or to satisfy authority 
figures’ suggestion that they should value the object more.69 Notably, for 
evidence of this claim, Klass and Zeiler rely on experiments in which 
individuals were prevented from holding the good or were told that they 
did not own the good.70 
But if anything, Klass and Zeiler’s work suggests that the explanation 
for the endowment effect lies in the connection account of ownership. 
According to their experiments, heightened valuation of the good 
disappeared precisely when the link between the individual and the good 
was deemphasized, either by telling the individual that the good was not 
owned by them or by taking it away from the individual.71 As explained 
above, when an ownership link is created between an object and oneself, 
the object begins to “reflect” the individual. At the outset, researchers find 
that an individual generally has positive associations with oneself.72 Objects 
in which the self is “anchored” have a concomitantly magnified value 
than objects that are not. And delinking the object from the individual, 
as Klass and Zeiler did, will result in a devaluation of the object. 
Empirical work supports this hypothesis. In a 1992 study that was 
mostly overlooked by the legal and endowment effect literatures, James 
Beggan conducted research that suggests that owners value their objects 
more than nonowners in order to enhance self-value.73 Beggan deliberately 
eschewed the term “endowment effect” for various theoretical reasons 
and argued that ownership theory better explains the phenomenon. 
Beggan’s work was not replicated until recently, where, using the theory 
of self-anchoring that has developed since Beggan, researchers argue that 
positive evaluations of objects are anchored in positive evaluations of 
self.74 Individuals therefore experience deprivation of already-owned 
objects as more harmful than a failure to provide the object in the first 
place. 
Finally, the factors outlined above that determine how connected an 
object is to a person have been found to determine the extent of the 
endowment effect.75 For example, Radin hypothesizes that “a relationship 
between person and thing is stronger when resources are bound up with the 
 
 69. Id. at 40–41; see Korobkin, supra note 65, at 1248 (suggesting additional causes). 
 70. Klass & Zeiler, supra note 66, at 40–41. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Anthony G. Greenwald & Shelly D. Farnham, Using the Implicit Association Test to Measure 
Self-Esteem and Self-Concept, 79 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1022, 1026 (2000). 
 73. James K. Beggan, On the Social Nature of Nonsocial Perception: The Mere Ownership Effect, 
62 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 229, 231 (1992). 
 74. Jochen Reb & Terry Connolly, Possession, Feelings of Ownership and the Endowment Effect, 
2 Judgment & Decision Making 107, 107 (2007). 
 75. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. 
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individual than when they are free to be traded or held for trade.”76 In the 
endowment effect context, experiments have shown that objects held for 
trade exert a lesser endowment than objects entwined with an individual’s 
sense of self.77 
C. An Alternative Conception of Ownership78 
It is important to note that this account of ownership as connectedness 
is contingent on context—it is only one, and today, probably not even the 
primary account of rights ownership under the Constitution. Rights can 
be conceived of in a way that ignores the fact that they are embedded in, 
connected to, and constitute an individual. Thus, on a distributive account 
of ownership, for example, the ownership scheme is merely the objective 
cartography of allotment under the law—who happens to own which 
bundle of rights. Ownership remains whether or not the individual is 
conscious of possessing the right. 
Modern political theorists and constitutional scholars are primarily 
concerned with a distributive theory of ownership—ownership describes 
not what already constitutes an individual but what an ideal system of 
justice allots to them. Distributive justice (Kantian, utilitarian, or otherwise) 
will ultimately determine the ownership scheme; subjective experiences 
of ownership are irrelevant. David Hume, who, in contradistinction to 
Locke and Hegel, explains that property is not determined by what 
naturally constitutes an individual, but what “the laws of justice” allot, 
best represents this view.79 Those “who make use of the words property, 
or right, or obligation, before they have explain’d the origin of justice . . . 
are guilty of a very gross fallacy.”80  
Prominent political theorists therefore engage with questions of 
ownership from this distributive point of view. John Rawls pointed to 
“primary goods” that individuals possess in a just world;81 Martha 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen identify a list of basic capabilities that all 
individuals should possess to engage in certain activities;82 Radin similarly 
distinguishes between “fungible” goods and goods that are essential to 
personhood.83 Notably, this account of ownership is not mutually exclusive 
from an account focusing on the bond between the individual and the 
 
 76. Radin, supra note 30, at 982. 
 77. Korobkin, supra note 65, at 1239. 
 78. There may be even other accounts of ownership that I do not engage with in this Article, but 
distinctions between theories of ownership are often determined by context. 
 79. David Hume, Hume’s Treatise of Morals and Selections from the Treatise of Passions 
136 (Ginn & Co. 1893) (1751). 
 80. Id. 
 81. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 214–15 (1971). 
 82. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities 
Approach 84 (2000); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 45 n.19 (1992). 
 83. Radin, supra note 30, at 986. 
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object—it simply takes more criteria into account. One can incorporate 
the connectedness account of ownership into the distributive justice 
account. Distributive justice can take into account the fact that there is a 
relationship between goods and the individual already owning them, and 
may give preference to the status quo for that reason. 
Under the distributive approach, the key question in the legal context 
is whether, under the scheme for distribution of rights dictated by the 
Constitution, an individual should possess a right against the State. Plaintiffs 
argue for the right to perform a certain activity—same-sex intimate conduct, 
abortion, home schooling of children—not because the right cannot be 
taken away once allotted to certain individuals, but rather because the 
Constitution distributes those rights to all individuals. The distribution is 
dictated, in part, by how important a right is and the countervailing 
government interest: certain rights are deemed “fundamental” to our 
constitutional tradition because they are constitutionally enumerated; 
others because they are rooted in this nation’s history or are important to 
an individual’s sense of autonomy;84 yet other allotments may improve 
efficient social functioning or maintain social cohesion.85  
The key here is that distributive ownership does not (necessarily) 
concern itself with whether the right is not provided in the first place or is 
taken away post hoc. In substantive due process contexts, for example, 
the Constitution is indifferent as to whether the right is being denied ex ante 
(that is, without being ever bestowed) or taken away ex post (that is, after 
possession). Any deviation from the optimum distribution—whether before 
or after the right is possessed—is unconstitutional. While this is probably 
the predominant theory of rights ownership in modern constitutional 
doctrine, as the next Part will show, connectedness theories played an 
important role as a historical matter. 
II.  Connectedness in Legal Doctrine 
My examination of the revocation of endowed and embedded rights 
continues by considering legal concepts that recognize the notion of 
connectedness. Part II argues that the notion that rights, especially 
property rights, become connected to an individual and embedded in her 
blood has long been part of Anglo-American legal understanding. This 
understanding appeared with the first discussion of rights as subjective 
legal capabilities in the thirteenth century, and continued into early modern 
America as legal doctrines such as attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of 
blood demonstrate. Each of these doctrines relied on a connectedness 
account of ownership. 
 
 84. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 85. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 490 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
1978) (1739). 
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Subpart B turns to the vested rights doctrine, which more squarely 
presents the question of revocation. Although it is hard to apply, the 
vested rights doctrine is not conceptually complicated. A vested interest 
is a right that is fully realized and present as opposed to a mere expectation. 
Any legislation that takes away a vested right is considered retroactive 
and is disfavored or outright prohibited.86 This doctrine, which dominated 
the nineteenth-century constitutional landscape, presents the clearest 
example of hostility to rights revocation.87 Under the doctrine, a failure 
to provide the right in the first place merits no constitutional scrutiny. 
However, revocation of the right once vested (if even possible) demands 
the accouterments of due process.  
Many rights have historically been considered “vested,” including 
non-property rights. For example, the California Supreme Court held 
that the rights that attach to same-sex spouses for the couples that had 
already married had vested and that Proposition 8 did not repeal these 
rights.88 I argue in Subpart B that the determinants of whether a right has 
vested, such as time, reliance, and completion of formalities, are meant to 
measure how “connected” a right is to an individual. While the doctrine 
has largely been the province of specialized areas of law such as zoning 
and pensions, recent same-sex marriage cases have returned the doctrine to 
the vanguard of constitutional litigation. I therefore turn to a closer analysis 
of these cases. 
I conclude in Subpart C by explaining that the considerations that 
determine that a right has vested may be present in circumstances where 
courts, for various reasons, decide not to invoke the doctrine. In such 
cases, courts are still loath to permit rights revocation. Again, while this 
is apparent across multiple areas of law, which I describe briefly, the 
Affordable Care Act case is a prominent example of this principle. 
A. Rights Connectedness in Legal History 
In this Subpart I show that the Anglo-American legal tradition has 
long treated some rights as somehow part of—and embedded in—an 
individual. First, I examine the concept of “vesting.” The term is used 
across vast historical periods. For the purposes of this Article, I simply 
note that every major legal thinker that invokes the term uses it to 
 
 86. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer, 892 P.2d 497, 500 (Kan. 1995); see generally Peterson 
v. City of Minneapolis, 173 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 1969). James L. Kainen provides a detailed historical 
discussion of the varied contexts in which the vested rights doctrine has been deployed in the Supreme 
Court—land, financial payments, and commissions. See Kainen, supra note 18, at 421. My point is 
simply that the Court’s investigation of vesting of a particular right (whatever the right is) has always 
been carried out with an eye to whether the right can be taken away; once a state provides a right and 
it vests in the recipient, attempts to take away that right are disfavored, or even outright prohibited. 
 87. The vested rights doctrine discussed in Part II.B draws on the same conceptual roots of 
ownership-as-connectedness, but is distinct from the legal concepts and doctrines described in Part II.A. 
 88. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 120 (Cal. 2009).  
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describe property as connecting to an individual. Similarly, other legal 
doctrines, such as attainder or corruption of blood, also rely on the 
notion of property as embedded within an individual. These concepts, while 
rarely (if ever) invoked today, most clearly exemplify the connectedness 
account of property, and hence bear some description. Underlying these 
legal concepts was an understanding that property constituted who the 
individual was, and that investing property in the individual, or divesting 
it, could fundamentally alter that identity. 
It is unclear to what extent the vested rights doctrine, which properly 
deals with the question of revoking vested rights, can be directly traced 
to these doctrines or concepts. Certainly, the legal concept of “vesting” 
that describes an item of property as becoming closely connected to an 
individual is closely related, and probably logically precedent, to the vested 
rights doctrine, which prohibits taking away these closely connected 
rights. However, given the range of historical periods across which the 
concepts of “vestedness” appear, this Article does not seek to develop 
this relationship any further. Suffice it to say all these doctrines are 
conceptually related in that they consider property as embedded in the 
individual. But doctrinally speaking, at least, they remain distinct concepts. 
1. “Vesting” of Property 
Descriptions of rights as “vested,” and therefore becoming embedded 
or connected to the individual, appear across historical periods. The 
earliest discussions date back to the earliest days of English jurisprudence in 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries, against a backdrop in which the term 
“right” itself (ius) was in the process of being developed. Thus, in exploring 
the concept of vesting in this context, it may be that we are discussing the 
term with respect to something that is not quite fully understood as a 
“right” in the modern sense. Nonetheless, the concept of vesting was 
applied to the medieval analogs of rights—possession, obligations, and 
powers. 
Around 1100, the whole corpus of Roman law was recovered. Next 
came an immensely influential codification of church law in Gratian’s 
Decretum.89 These legal watersheds led to intense debates and important 
developments in theories of rights of the time.90 The meaning of the term 
“right” (ius) was ambiguous.91 Classically, the term ius denoted justice—
the moral code that determined right and wrong. However, around the 
twelfth century, the term ius began to adopt its modern meaning, denoting 
 
 89. See Decretum Gratiani, in Gratian: The Treatise on Laws (Augustine Thompson trans., Catholic 
Univ. of Am. Press 1993) (1151). 
 90. See generally Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, 
Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150–1625 (1997) (“Civilis autem est quæ animo tantum retinetur. 
Naturalis, quæ corpore, et aliquando iusta est et aliquando iniusta.”). 
 91. Id. at 45. 
K - Konnoth_18 (ONLINE) (Do Not Delete) 6/22/2015 9:49 PM 
1388 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1365 
subjective individual rights—“a faculty, an ability, a liberty to act” by the 
individual.92 The Laws and Customs of England, by Henry Bracton, the 
most prominent jurist of this time, provided the first known systematic 
exposition of English law and contains one of the first examinations of 
this new approach to the idea of “rights.” He noted that “ius” primarily 
refers to an objective moral code, but secondarily that it also indicates 
subjective individual rights, or “potestas.”93 
The concept of vesting, according to which a right became part of an 
individual’s soul, was born concurrently with this new idea of rights. In 
the property context, Bracton explained, “[p]ossession is divided into 
civil and natural possession.”94 “Natural” ownership is purely a question 
of “physical occupation.”95 Nothing more profound is at play. Thus, one 
loses natural ownership at death, not at the time of death, but only “when 
the body is borne away.”96 Civil ownership, by contrast, is connected to our 
soul. “Civil [ownership] is . . . retained by the soul [animo] alone.”97 
Therefore, one “loses civil possession [at the time of death,] when the 
soul [animus] quits the body.”98 Civil possession is therefore tied to the 
soul, and is lost when the soul is no longer present. 
The difference between natural and civil possession translates to a 
difference between “bare” and “vested” possession. Bare possession is 
simply the fact of physical (or natural) possession without consideration 
of “right.”99 Vested possession is possession that is “clothed . . . by right, 
title, or time.”100 Transfer of right or title occurs through formalities such 
as livery of seisin.101  
As I explain in greater detail below, formalities and time determine 
how connected a right or object is to an individual’s sense of self even 
today.102 On Bracton’s account, they served a similar function. Formalities 
are an outward manifestation of deeper psychological processes. 
Formalities, to be sure, are “what is outward, in the light of external acts 
and according to the sight and understanding of men.”103 But the 
formalities reflect inner psychological bonds. They show that “the donor 
 
 92. Id. at 30. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 2 Henry de Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 122 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., 
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. 1998) (1235–1240), available at http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/ 
Common/SearchPage.htm. 
 95. Id. at 122. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 155. 
 99. Id. at 122 (“Item alia nuda, alia vestita. Nuda, ubi quis nihil iuris habet in re, nec aliquam iuris 
scintillam, sed tantum nudam pedum positionem: vestita, iure, titulo, vel tempore.”).   
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 130. 
 102. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 103. 2 Bracton, supra note 94, at 130. 
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. . . [lacks] the possessory state of mind,” and the donee takes the item 
with the intent to possess.104 The formalities therefore reflect a transfer of 
the psychological bond as well. Witnesses can testify to this, and that the 
transfer was made “freely and of [the donor’s] own will.”105 Finally, even 
without formalities, time similarly reflects a changed connection between 
the object and its owner. “[L]ong possession, like a mother, gives birth to 
right in the possessor.”106 Vesting here was tied to the state of one’s sole 
or mind. 
Bracton extended a similar analysis to contract law. An agreement 
“is contracted [using] several vestments, [including] a thing [consideration], 
by words, by writing, by consent, by traditio [, or] by conjunction.”107 
Without these, a right is not vested, and its violation cannot be remedied 
through legal action.108 Each of these formalities helps indicate some 
deeper bond between the object and its owner. 
While I argue that the modern sense of vesting also has a 
relationship to one’s soul or mind, Bracton’s use of the term is different 
from how it is presently used. For Bracton, vesting was best understood 
transitively—formalities indicating the state of the individual’s mind or 
soul vested or clothed the right. There is no use of vesting in the 
intransitive sense—of the right vesting in a person, as the term is more 
commonly used today. Possibly, as a result of this limited understanding 
of the term “vest,” and indeed, the novelty of using ius to indicate 
subjective individual rights, the term “vested” was rarely used in the 
period. Word searches of the first Year Books, which appeared around 
this time and reported case proceedings before the Common Bench, 
reveal that variations of the term “vest” were rarely used.109 Bracton’s 
contemporary commentators rarely, if ever, used the term. Neither of the 
more summary works known as Glanville or Fleta used the term.110 
Similarly, Britton—one of the first major thinkers after Bracton—
preferred the term “reposed” instead of “vested.”111 
As time progressed, however, the term gradually saw increased 
usage, along with a subtle change in meaning—but one that still indicated 
connectedness to an individual. Rights were mostly invoked in the 
context of property; courts would commonly refer to estates as being in 
 
 104. Id. “Animo possidendi.” In modern usage, this would translate to the intent of possessing. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 157. 
 107. Id. at 283–84. 
 108. Id. at 45. 
 109. Yearbook of the Reign of King Edward the First Years XX & XI (Alfred J. Horwood ed. 
& trans., 1866). These variations included vest, veste, vestu, vesti, vestire, vester, vestier, vesty, vestira, 
vestiras, vestera. See generally id. As late as 1292 or 1293, the term does not appear in the Year Book 
of that period. Id.  
 110. A Translation of Glanville (John Beames ed., 1812). 
 111. 1 Britton 212, 342 (Francis Nichols ed. & trans., Clarendon Press 1865). 
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(“en”) a person. Slowly, the term “vested” began to make an appearance in 
the Year Books during the course of the fourteenth century.112 But its use 
remained rare. When Thomas Lyttleton, another prominent jurist, wrote 
his Treatise on Tenures (arguably the first textbook on property law) in the 
fifteenth century, he used (when not quoting from elsewhere) a variation of 
“vest” less than ten times, far preferring the term “invest” with property 
or benefices.113 Coke, the next major legal expositor of private law, used 
the term less than thirty times across the various volumes of his work in 
the seventeenth century.114 
This dwarfs the over one hundred times that William Blackstone 
used the term “vest” in his Commentaries that were published in the 
following century.115 Notably, Blackstone became the first widely read 
commentator whose work survives today that hinted at a more detailed 
understanding of the term “vesting” since Bracton. Blackstone explained 
that vesting property rights relied on the fiction of feudal investiture. 
Under that fiction, “all lands were originally granted out by the sovereign, 
and are therefore holden, either mediately or immediately, of the crown.”116 
The land was granted directly or indirectly “by the ceremony of corporal 
investiture, or open and notorious delivery of possession.”117 And the 
modern day freehold which requires the “ceremony” of livery of seisin 
for conveyance “by the course of the common law . . . is the same as the 
fe[u]dal investiture.”118  
 
 112. For example, by the middle to the end of the century, the term began to be used on average 
once per every 100 pages of the Year Books. See Year Books of Richard II: 12 Richard II, A.D. 
1388–1389 (George F. Deiser ed., 1914); Year Books of the Reign of King Edward the Third Year 
XX (First Part) (Luke Owen Pike ed. & trans, 1908); Year Books of the Reign of King Edward 
the Third, Years XI and XII (Luke Owen Pike ed. & trans., 1885). 
 113. Thomas Littleton, Anciennes Loix des François, Conservées Dans les Coutumes 
Angloises (M. Houard ed., 2nd ed. 1769). 
 114. 1 Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England; Or, a Commentary 
upon Littleton (Charles Butler ed., 1985) (1628) [hereinafter Coke, First Part]; Edward Coke, The 
Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1642) 
[hereinafter Coke, Second Part]; Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of 
England; Concerning High Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown and Criminal Causes 
(London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1644) [hereinafter Coke, Third Part]; Edward Coke, The Fourth 
Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England;  Concerning the Jurisdiction of the Courts 
(London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1648) [hereinafter Coke, Fourth Part]. 
 115. One possible explanation for this increased usage is that the term “vested” was more commonly 
used in English, and of all these authors, Blackstone was the first to write in English. Another possibility 
is that individuals had become more comfortable with the use of rights language—so much so that some 
historians believe that the understanding of rights as subjective attributes of the individual originated 
only in the seventeenth century. See, e.g., Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin 
and Development 5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1982) (1979). 
 116. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *53. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at *104. Blackstone possibly overplays the role of the “investiture” fiction in the imagination 
of popular jurists; it is notable that Lyttleton, who preceded Blackstone by nearly two centuries, was far 
more comfortable using the term invest and investiture to discuss the conveyance of property than vesting. 
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But obtaining, and perhaps more importantly retaining and passing 
on, property through feudal investiture is grounded in aspects of identity 
that are more fundamental than mere economic gain. At the outset, 
obtaining property in Blackstone’s world fundamentally altered an 
individual’s social standing and the sets of rights and obligations that 
came with it. The investiture ceremony required “an oath of fealty,” and 
a “professing, that ‘[the grantee] did become [the lord’s] man, from that 
day forth, of life and limb and earthly honour.’”119 In the religious context, 
vast amounts of property were held by the church. Much litigation in the 
common law courts surrounded the livings that came with certain vicar or 
rector positions. To obtain the living,120 the “clerk . . . [must] be 
instituted.”121 This institution was an “investiture,” not just of the land, 
but “of the spiritual part of the benefice: for by institution the care of the 
souls of the parish is committed to the charge of the clerk.”122 Vesting of 
property on Blackstone’s account therefore was connected to broader 
aspects of social role. It determined an individual’s social status. It 
represented loyalty, and connected the individual to a community. 
Blackstone frequently treated property interests as living within an 
individual—the right “abides” or “resides” in a person, and the “ultimate 
property of the lands is in himself.”123 Indeed, the right needs a person 
within which to reside. Unless such a person exists, the right cannot 
transfer: 
For, unless the freehold passes out of the grantor at the time when the 
remainder is created, such freehold remainder is void: it cannot pass 
out of him, without vesting somewhere; and in the case of a contingent 
remainder it must vest in the particular tenant, else it can vest nowhere 
. . . .124  
But once an actual person exists, and the right is vested, the right “shall 
not afterwards be taken from him.”125  
Even though Blackstone’s understanding of vesting differs from that 
of Bracton’s, like Bracton, he was quite clear in distinguishing between 
these vested rights and the “mere right of property,” which is analogous 
to Bracton’s concept of “bare” possession. And as in Bracton, formalities 
determine whether a right fully vests. As he repeatedly reminded, us in 
different contexts ranging from avowdsons to freeholds, mere “nomination 
 
 119. Id. at *53 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120. Cf. id. at *242 (without which confirmation and investiture, the elected bishop could neither 
be consecrated nor receive any secular profits). 
 121. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *389. 
 122. Id. at 390. 
 123. 2 Blackstone, supra note 116, at *197. 
 124. Id. at *171. 
 125. Id. at *128. 
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and institution”126 or “mere words” are insufficient; “material ceremon[ies]” 
such as actual entry or livery of seisin determines whether the right vests.127 
It is only when a right vests that it is absorbed into the being and 
blood of an individual that “makes a man complete owner; so as to 
transmit the inheritance to his own heirs.”128 Once formalities such as 
“corporal investiture and livery of seisin” are complete, they “give[] the 
tenant so strong a hold of the land, that it never after can be wrested from 
him during his life.”129 And of course, in the case of incorporeal interests, 
other formalities apply to distinguish between “a vague and indeterminate 
right” and a title vested by “the verdict of the jurors, and judgment of the 
court.”130 What remained remarkably stable across the centuries during 
which the understanding of vestedness changed was the relationship 
between vestedness and personhood.  
2. Pre-American Accounts of Blood Ownership 
In describing the vesting of property, Blackstone also referred to the 
related question of corruption of blood. As he explained, the violation of 
the oath taken during the investiture ceremony transforms the individual 
herself. With the “commission of any felony,” for example, “the fe[u]dal 
covenant and mutual bond of fealty are held to be broken” and “blood of 
the tenant . . . is corrupted and stained.”131 As a result, “the inheritable 
quality of [the felon’s] blood is extinguished and blotted out for ever. . . . 
In consequence of which corruption and extinction of hereditary blood, 
the land of all felons would immediately revest in the lord . . . .”132 
According to Blackstone’s metaphor, the tenant’s ability to hold 
property is fundamentally grounded in the tenant’s blood. Upon the 
commission of a crime of sufficient import, “the blood of the tenant 
being utterly corrupted and extinguished, it follows, not only that all that 
he now has should escheat from him, but also that he should be incapable 
of inheriting any thing for the future.”133  
The corruption of blood metaphor appears at length only in the 
work of early modern (that is, postmedieval) commentators. This work 
demonstrates how, for these writers at least, property ownership rights 
were linked to fundamental aspects of an individual’s being. Medieval 
writers focused on the “contractual aspects” of vassalage that were common 
to their time, and the breaking of an oath was simply understood as a 
 
 126. Id. at *312. 
 127. Id. at *311. 
 128. Id. at *312. 
 129. Id. at *386–87. 
 130. Id. at *438. 
 131. Id. at *252. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at *253. 
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violation of the contract.134 Glanville recognized forfeiture as the result of a 
violation of the contract between the lord and the tenant, but never 
treated it as an issue of the “corruption” of the blood.135 Similarly, 
Bracton noted that property is forfeit to the lord simply because the 
individual violated his contract with the lord by committing a crime—his 
passing reference to heirs also not being able to inherit property as the 
“seed and blood” of the oath breakers is a far cry from Blackstone’s 
detailed assessment of the “heritable quality” of the tenant’s blood.136 
Britton similarly referred in passing to attainder with no reference to the 
corruption of blood, though at least one of his translators made that 
leap.137  
Historical events of the late fifteenth century, however, birthed what 
appears to be the first theory of property that embedded ownership in an 
individual’s blood accompanied by an understanding that if the blood 
became corrupted, the property was lost. Before the fifteenth century, only 
courts could impose attainder or corruption of blood pursuant to a judicial 
sentence. There was also little controversy over the effect and purpose of 
attainder; any confusion that existed over the process and varieties of 
treason that could justify royal attainder was largely resolved in the Grand 
Statute of Treason in 1352.138 However, in the fourteenth century, during 
the War of the Roses, “when the alternations of conflict placed in power 
one government after another,” attainder for treason was imposed 
increasingly broadly and with greater frequency.139 More importantly, to 
guarantee speedy retribution, this attainder was imposed not by judges, 
but by Parliament. In light of these developments, instigators of the 
process were at pains to justify it “with as much appearance of legality as 
possible.”140 
In this context, later-Chief Justice Fortescue and others, as members 
of Parliament, exerted “the ‘most vengeable labour’” in defense of 
attainder.141 Fortescue had to walk a fine line—on one hand, he had to 
assure his king’s supporters that the collection, preservation, and 
inheritance of property, even against monarchs’ whims, were secure. At 
the same time, under certain circumstances, he sought to show that 
attainder was appropriate. In achieving this goal, Fortescue anticipated 
Locke, tracing the origin of property to God’s injunction to Adam “[i]n 
 
 134. Frank W. Harris, The Law & Economics of High Treason from its Feudal Origin to the Early 
Seventeenth Century, 22 Val. L. Rev. 81, 83–84 (1977). 
 135. A Translation of Glanville, supra note 110, at 189. 
 136. 2 Bracton, supra note 94, at 366. 
 137. 1 Britton, supra note 111, at 37. 
 138. John G. Bellamy, The Law of Treason in England in the Later Middle Ages 89–102 (2004). 
 139. J.R. Lander, Attainder and Forfeiture, 1453 to 1509, 4 Hist. J. 119, 120 (1961). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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the sweat of thy brow thouh shalt eat bread.”142 This, Fortescue argued, 
showed that man gained a property interest in items for which he 
expended labor. Property  
compensates for the sweat by which the body of the acquirer is 
enfeebled, . . . [to] compensate the damage resulting from his loss of 
bodily wholeness . . . thus the property takes the place of the man’s 
bodily integrity, which he has lost, and coheres as an accident to the 
toiler.143  
The property then “accompanies a man’s blood” and is “united to him” 
upon his expenditure of labor. In effect, because his blood carries through 
to his heir, the property may also pass down to his heir.144 
While the novelty of Fortescue’s theory has been celebrated as the 
first of a labor, blood-based theory of property,145 historians have 
overlooked that the theory had a polemical purpose. Fortescue played an 
important role in the widespread attainders of 1459.146 What historians 
refer to as Fortescue’s “innovative” and “distinctive” blood theory of 
property developed during the 1460s147 was developed precisely to allow 
Fortescue to provide a convincing explanation of disinheritance by 
attainder. He explained that by attainder, the convict’s “blood is forthwith 
adjudged by that law to be so corrupted that, although by the prince’s 
favour he escape death, he nevertheless will not be capable henceforth of 
succeeding his parents in their inheritances, nor will any of his posterity 
succeed him in his inheritance.”148 Fortescue, rather than the champion of 
property rights that historians take him to be,149 was quite the opposite. 
Like his better known writings, Fortescue’s property theory is better 
understood as polemical, grounding the corruption of blood explanation 
of attainder and forfeiture. 
The success of this theory is reflected in the heavy reliance on the 
corruption of blood metaphor by subsequent writers. Early modern 
treatises focused far less on contractual language. For the treatise 
authors, a crime defined the individual as corrupt through and through.150 
Thus, according to Coke, attainder rendered one “ignoble,” and resulted 
 
 142. 1 John Fortescue, On the Law of Nature, in The Works of Sir John Fortescue 291 (Thomas 
Fortescue Lord Clermont ed., Chiswick Press 1869) (1486). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Edwin Callahan, Blood, Sweat, and Wealth: Fortescue’s Theory of the Origin of Property, 
17 Hist. of Pol. Thought 21, 23 (1996). 
 146. Lander, supra note 139, at 120. 
 147. 1 Christopher Pierson, Just Property: A History in the Latin West, Volume One: Wealth, 
Virtue, and the Law 126 (2013); Callahan, supra note 145, at 27 n.28. 
 148. 1 Fortescue, supra note 142.  
 149. See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 145, at 28. 
 150. A detailed exposition is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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in the forfeiture of property.151 Francis Bacon provided a similar 
exposition.152 Hale mentioned it around fifty times across his two volumes 
on the History of the Pleas of the Crown.153  
This is not to say that the contractual aspects of Bracton’s theory are 
lost—they remain, and explain why the estate is forfeited for small 
offenses such as making improper grants of the property. But corruption 
of blood occurs upon the commission of greater offenses. Property is 
understood as being absorbed into the blood of the individual who held 
it. When that blood is corrupted, the property is lost. This concept carried 
over into the United States, where jurists approached questions of property 
ownership as implicating the blood and being of the owner. 
3. Blood Ownership in Nineteenth Century America 
The corruption of blood and related doctrines, which treated 
property as somehow embedded in the blood of an individual, continued to 
play a prominent role in American property law until legislatures began 
statutory reform in the late nineteenth century. However, until then, 
corruption of blood played an important role in three sets of cases. The 
first set of cases date back to the early nineteenth century, as the United 
States dealt with the consequences of transitioning from British rule to 
self rule. The next cases arose when former slaves sought to hold or pass 
on property. The third and most enlightening involve confiscation of 
enemy property after the Civil War. All of these contexts show how deeply 
the blood-ownership metaphor was embedded in American property law. 
a. British Ownership in Postcolonial America 
After American independence, few areas of law presented more 
vexing questions than questions of inheritance.154 On the one hand, 
hostility to their former enemy made legislators wary of permitting British 
subjects to own property—and indeed, under the common law, an alien 
could not inherit or devise property; legislatures passed and then 
repealed statutes permitting inheritability.155 On the other hand, citizens 
had close personal and economic ties with relatives in Britain, making 
the ability to pass on property important. 
 
 151. 3 A Systematic Arrangement of Lord Coke’s First Institute of the Laws of England 447 
(J.H. Thomas, ed., Alexander Towar 1836) (1818). See Coke, First Part, supra note 114, at xc, 53, 107; 
Coke, Second Part, supra note 114, at 68; see generally Coke, Third Part, supra note 114. 
 152. Francis Bacon, Elements of the Common Laws of England: Branched into a Double 
Trial 49 (Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1630). 
 153. See generally 1 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (Prof’l Books 
Ltd. 1971) (1736). 
 154. See generally Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership Without Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen 
Property Rights, 19 Mich. J. Race & L. 1 (2013). 
 155. See id. at 4. 
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The Supreme Court faced the question of alien inheritability in a 
trio of important cases in the early part of the century, with Justice 
Johnson penning the key opinions. Johnson, it should be noted, explicitly 
understood property vesting as imbuing in the individual. As he famously 
noted in Fletcher v. Peck, explaining that land that Georgia had granted 
could not be summarily divested by a subsequent enactment—the 
property right once “vested in the individual; becomes intimately blended 
with his existence, as essentially so as the blood that circulates through 
his system.”156 
In the alienage cases, which the Court heard and judged at the same 
time, Johnson took as given this understanding of property ownership. In 
the first case, M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, the Court took the rare step of 
“publishing the arguments of counsel” separately from its opinions 
(which came a few years later) because of the “importance and interesting 
nature of the questions involved.”157 The following year, the Court 
extensively published arguments in Lambert’s Lessee v. Paine.158 In both 
cases, counsel, arguing against alien inheritability, relied on the common 
law rule that aliens lack “inheritable blood.” But at the same time, 
counsel had to reckon with the fact that American citizens would 
potentially inherit and devise land in Britain, even as they denied that 
the British could inherit or devise American land. Accordingly, they 
made an ingenious argument: Americans born during British rule were 
born imbued with allegiance to the King. Under English common law, this 
allegiance could not be renounced. Consequently, British-born American 
subjects had a “common bond” that “connect[ed] the inheritable blood” 
between them and their British ancestors, allowing them to “inherit 
[from] British subjects.”159 But the inverse was never true—after the 
American Revolution, “British subjects, not in this country at that time, 
never owed allegiance” to the United States, and “therefore, they [could] 
have no inheritable blood as to lands in this country.”160 The court punted 
in both of these cases. In the M’Ilvaine opinion, written by Justice Johnson, 
the Court held that the inheritor was an American subject.161 In Paine, 
the Court held that the devisee did not intend for the alien to inherit.162 
The Court finally engaged with the question in Dawson’s Lessee v. 
Godfrey, where Justice Johnson explicitly recognized that while pre-
Revolution born Americans could inherit from British subjects, the reverse 
 
 156. 10 U.S. 87, 143 (1810). 
 157. 6 U.S. 280, 280 n.† (1805). 
 158. See 7 U.S. 97 (1805). 
 159. Id. at 114. 
 160. Id.  
 161. M’Ilvaine, 6 U.S. at 297. 
 162. Paine, 7 U.S. at 129–30. 
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was not true because British subjects lacked American inheritable blood.163 
Lower courts recognized a corollary of this rule: because of the lack of 
inheritable blood, the property could never vest in, and therefore, could 
not pass through, an alien. 
Where a person dies, leaving issue, who are aliens, the latter are not 
deemed his heirs-in-law, for they have no inheritable blood, and the 
estate descends to the next of kin, who have an inheritable blood, in 
the same manner as if no such alien issue were in existence.164  
Finally, even if a person naturalized, property could vest in their blood only 
from that time forth; they could not claim to have inherited property before 
that time.165 
Legislatures, and, begrudgingly, the courts, later began to relax this 
approach. The United States and Britain signed treaties loosening the 
common law rule, and states adopted statutes permitting aliens to inherit, 
which courts interpreted narrowly at first,166 but with increasing leniency 
as the century progressed.167 In the Supreme Court, in turn, Justice 
Johnson’s hard line approach—denying that property could vest in alien 
blood—began to falter. In Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Court, 
in an opinion written by Justice Story, reversed the Virginia Supreme 
Court, holding that (what we would understand as) due process was 
required before lands of an alien could be forfeited to the sovereign.168 
Justice Johnson dissented because of the “disability” in an alien’s blood.169  
Courts also frequently relied on the notion that property resided in 
an individual’s blood in cases involving illegitimate children. One court 
explained that an illegitimate child could “inherit nothing . . . [for she] has no 
ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be derived.”170 Accordingly, 
as the Court eloquently observed in an oft-quoted passage from Stevenson’s 
Heirs v. Sullivant, when a child was illegitimate “[t]he current of inheritable 
blood was stopt in its passage from, and through the mother, so as to 
prevent the descent of the mother’s property and of the property of her 
ancestors, either to her own illegitimate children, or to their legitimate 
offspring.”171 Indeed, an illegitimate child could not inherit from his 
legitimate offspring: “[P]arents must be found who shall be the actual or 
 
 163. 8 U.S. 321, 323 (1808). This was not always so in state courts, however. See Martin v. Brown, 
7 N.J.L. 305, 339 (1799). 
 164. Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. 453, 461 (1819); see also Jackson v. Green, 7 Wend. 333 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1831). 
 165. Lee v. Smith, 18 Tex. 141, 141–42 (1856). 
 166. McCreery’s Lessee v. Somerville, 22 U.S. 354, 358 (1824); see also Spratt v. Spratt, 26 U.S. 343 (1828). 
 167. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879); Hanrick v. Patrick, 119 U.S. 156 (1886). 
 168. 11 U.S. 603, 621 (1813). As Story explained, “It enables the owner to contest the question of 
alienage directly . . .  [and] affords an opportunity for the public to know the nature, the value, and the 
extent of its acquisitions . . . .” Id. at 623. 
 169. Id. at 629 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 170. Blair v. Adams, 59 F. 243, 244 (C.C.D. Tex. 1893) (citations omitted). 
 171. 18 U.S. 207, 261 (1820). 
K - Konnoth_18 (ONLINE) (Do Not Delete) 6/22/2015 9:49 PM 
1398 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1365 
assumed fountain of inheritable blood, and create the kindred of 
brothers.”172 Much like corruption of blood, illegitimacy cast a “legal taint 
of blood” in the individual, which the legislature could correct.173 
Legislatures slowly, and not without controversy, began to pass statutes 
permitting illegitimate children to inherit that, as one court vividly put it, 
“injected into his veins inheritable blood in its most comprehensive 
sense,” permitting illegitimate children to inherit.174 But, excepting certain 
states, these statutes were narrow in their reach, and read narrowly by 
the courts.175 
b. Slave Property Ownership 
As states began to allow illegitimate children and aliens to inherit 
property as the century progressed, the specter of blood ownership 
remained but was invoked in different contexts to deal with the 
repercussions of the Civil War.176 The first set of consequences courts had 
to deal with involved the passage of property from former slaves to their 
heirs. In the majority of these cases arising in southern courts, the courts 
effectively held that the heir was illegitimate and therefore unable to 
inherit, although their decisions were more nuanced. For example, in 
Daniel v. Sams, the Florida Supreme Court explained that “slaves were not 
competent to contract a marriage, the issue of which would have inheritable 
blood.”177 Moreover, since slaves themselves did not have inheritable 
blood, “any other person” could also not inherit from a slave, “and for 
want of heirs at law their property would go to the State.”178  
The Alabama Supreme Court initially adopted a different approach, 
relying on alienage rather than illegitimacy cases to limit the ability of 
blacks to obtain property in the state. In 1875, the court was faced with a 
difficult case involving the inheritance of children of former slaves.179 There 
was no question that the children were legitimate since neither parent 
was a slave at the time of marriage.180 Unable to claim that the children 
were illegitimate, the court instead held that the children were aliens at 
the time of their parents’ deaths because Alabama prohibited free blacks 
 
 172. Brewer’s Lessee v. Blougher, 39 U.S. 178, 195 (1840). 
 173. Appeal of Edwards, 108 Pa. 283, 285 (1885). 
 174. Hicks v. Smith, 22 S.E. 153, 155 (Ga. 1895); see Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: 
Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America 213 (1985) (referring in passing to this trend). 
 175. See, e.g., Dickinson’s Appeal, 42 Conn. 491, 511–12 (1875). 
 176. The trend was broader than the three cases described in Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law 
of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 221 (1999). 
 177. 17 Fla. 487, 494 (1880); see Williams v. Kimball, 16 So. 783 (Fla. 1895). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Donovan v. Pitcher, 53 Ala. 411, 415–16 (1875). 
 180. Id. at 411–12. 
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from residing in the state.181 The next year, the court overruled previous 
cases that held that children of slave marriages were legitimate.182 
c. Blood Ownership and Connectedness in the Post-Civil 
War Confiscation Debates 
The distinction between the theories of property I am expounding 
came into sharp relief during the confiscation debates of the Civil War. 
The debates and subsequent Supreme Court opinions toggled between 
two views of property. The first—on which I have been focusing here—was 
the traditional connectedness account of property, which President Lincoln 
and the conservatives supported. On this account, an individual is connected 
to his property; divestment can only occur if the individual somehow is 
corrupted and can therefore no longer hold the property. And upon 
divestment, the property right must reattach to some other individual or 
entity. On the other account, advanced by the radicals, moderates, and later, 
government lawyers, property ownership merely represented distributive 
rules, as I outline in Part I.C. One may redistribute this property, and put 
it to different uses, without engaging with broader metaphysical 
questions of whether the blood of the original owner was corrupted, and 
to whom the new property right attaches.  
The debates began with the passage of the First and Second 
Confiscation Acts of 1861 and 1862, which provided for the “permanent, 
uncompensated seizure of all the real and personal property” of “all those 
who recognized and supported the . . . Confederacy.”183 As Daniel 
Hamilton details, the 1862 Act, which provided for, among other things, 
the emancipation of slaves and convictions for treason, was controversial, 
but its passage represented a compromise between coalitions of “radicals,” 
“conservatives,” and “moderates.”184  
Radicals and moderates sought to confiscate the property of 
confederates.185 However, conservatives argued that permanent property 
seizure without trial violated the constitutional prohibition on corruption 
of blood, as well as (relatedly) protections of vested property rights 
protected by the due process clause.186 Both arguments were based on the 
understanding that property is fundamentally embedded in personhood; for 
property to become divested, there had to be some defect in personhood.   
Radicals and moderates acknowledged that this represented the usual 
understanding under which property was divested. Under that traditional 
 
 181. Id. at 415. 
 182. Cantelou v. Doe, 56 Ala. 519, 521 (1876). 
 183. Daniel W. Hamilton, Limits of Sovereignty: Property Confiscation in the Union and the 
Confederacy during the Civil War 1 (2007). 
 184. Id. at 25–26. 
 185. Id. at 33–34, 60, 62, 72–74. 
 186. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1572, 1754 (1862). 
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view, the law would “corrupt the blood,” “destroy its inheritable 
qualities,”187 or engage in “confiscation of property as a punishment for 
the crime of its owner.”188 The traditional form of property confiscation 
“did not, strictly speaking, attach in rem,” that is, to the owned object, 
but rather, was the “part or consequence of the judgment of conviction 
of the offender.”189 The loss of the object occurred solely because of the 
link between the object and its owner—it was confiscated for no other 
reason than because its owner was a criminal. “[T]he thing was then 
primarily considered as the offender, and the offense was attached to 
it.”190 
But radicals and moderates sought to construct a different 
understanding of property—one where they could redistribute property 
without considering the owner. Under this view, the law could get at 
property without going through their owners, and indeed, without 
acknowledging a bond between the owner and the property at all. Their 
bill did “not pronounce judgment against any one,” it only “affect[ed] 
property alone.”191 The radicals claimed their confiscation was different. 
The confiscation they were urging had no ramifications upon the 
individual’s personhood: “[T]he thing used in violating the law may be 
seized and condemned without a judgment upon the guilt of the owner.”192 
This, they argued, was similar to confiscations in admiralty (prize) or 
revenue cases where the property was seized and confiscated through 
civil in rem proceedings without a judgment as to the owner’s guilt:193 
[I]f a man is trying to smuggle goods . . . [t]he goods are the instrument 
of the wrong; and therefore . . . you may take and condemn the 
thing . . . you do not give it a trial by jury, as when you proceed against 
the man.194  
They relied on previous cases involving admiralty seizures of Confederate 
naval cargo and British possessions.195 Their version of the bill required 
the proceedings to conform to admiralty or revenue seizure proceedings 
to maintain the fiction that property was being seized without attainting 
the person of the offender.196 
Conservatives and the President agreed with the radicals that 
traditional forfeiture attainted and branded the offender himself, and not 
just his property. But that, they argued, was precisely what this bill 
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achieved by permanently confiscating property. The theory the radicals 
offered differed substantially from the vested rights approach to 
property, which had come to characterize American jurisprudence, and 
the conservatives refused to accept it. “I do not, I must confess,” said 
Senator Joseph Wright, a Unionist from Indiana, “exactly see how you 
can get at the property of the person by a proceeding against his estate, 
when you must necessarily deal first with the person.”197 Senator 
Jefferson Davis of Mississippi was even more blunt: “The idea of 
punishment being attached to the offense or the offender’s property, is 
simply absurd and impossible.”198 Thus, to divest property, the 
“proceeding in rem . . . ought to be a proceeding against a person.”199 
And, if by confiscating property, the Act branded the person himself, 
then the bill was “monstrous” because it tarred all southern soldiers—
whether leaders or compulsory recruits—with the same brush.200 In this 
way, the conservatives rejected a theory of property that did not conceive 
of it as inextricably connected to the individual—even to the extent that the 
in rem approach applied to certain circumstances, it was no longer good 
law, belonging to “an age less enlightened than the present” and not 
conducive to “modern usages.”201 
Finally, for President Lincoln and the conservatives, the key factor 
that revealed the seizures to be corruption of blood was the following: 
“[U]nder the Constitution upon a trial and conviction of a traitor you can 
only take the life estate[;] these measures assume that without any trial 
or conviction you may take the fee simple.”202 This operates as 
“corruption of the blood, or the forfeiture of the property of the offender 
for a longer period than his life.”203 At the eleventh hour, President 
Lincoln informed Congress that he would veto the Act unless it included 
a resolution that the forfeiture was only for the life of the wrongdoer—
“it declares forfeiture extending beyond the lives of the guilty parties, 
whereas the Constitution . . . declares that no attainder of treason shall 
work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the 
person attainted.”204 Congress included the resolution.205 
The Supreme Court’s approach toward determining which theory of 
property the in rem proceedings represented was schizophrenic. In 
Armstrong’s Foundry, the United States argued that if a confiscatee 
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received a pardon, he did not automatically retrieve the confiscated 
property.206 Following the radicals, the government explained that the 
pardon expunged any conviction of guilt that he had incurred.207 However, 
it did not affect the property.208 In other words, because like the radicals, 
the government assumed no bond between the property and its owner, 
proceedings involving one did not affect proceedings regarding the other. 
The Court, however, appeared to disagree and side with the conservative 
view: it was “unable to concur in” the radical view and held that the 
forfeiture concerned the person, not the thing. According to the Court, 
“the statute regarded the consent of the owner to the employment of his 
property in aid of the rebellion as an offence, and inflicted forfeiture as a 
penalty.”209 
A mere three years later, however, in Miller v. United States, the 
Court had to reckon with the constitutionality of the Act as a whole, and 
had to squarely deal with the fact that the “penalty” it alluded to in 
Armstrong was imposed without notice, trial by jury, or other 
accouterments of due process.210 Ignoring Armstrong, the Court now 
sided with the radicals on the issue: 
[Confiscation] has no reference whatever to the personal guilt of the 
owner of confiscated property, and the act of confiscation is not a 
proceeding against him. The confiscation is not because of crime, but 
because of the relation of the property to the opposing belligerent, a 
relation in which it has been brought in consequence of its ownership. 
It is immaterial to it whether the owner be an alien or a friend, or even 
a citizen or subject of the power that attempts to appropriate the 
property. . . . It treated the property as the guilty subject. . . . [and 
therefore did not violate the] prohibit[ion on] bills of attainder.211 
And while the Act confiscated the property only of certain individuals 
who provided certain kinds of aid to the enemy, “[p]ersons were referred 
to only to identify the property.”212 
Miller’s approach would have been acceptable if property was 
generally conceived of in its own right as separate from the individual. 
However, as subsequent litigation would soon prove, the case was divorced 
from background property law principles and left numerous questions 
unanswered. In treating the Act as affecting only property, Miller ignored 
the fact that these background principles took for granted that property 
was enmeshed with the person. The basic issue that Miller (and the 
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radical Senators) ignored was that background property principles rely 
on a connectedness understanding and presume that the fee resides in 
some holder. Accordingly, Miller failed to answer the question if the 
property was confiscated, the question remained—who held the fee? If the 
property was only temporarily confiscated during the owner’s life, and if 
the confiscation did not reflect on the owner’s guilt or innocence, then, 
some would answer, the owner. But the Court decided, in 1875, that the 
fee did not reside in the owner and he could not sell future interests in 
the property because congressional purpose would be “thwarted” if the 
property remained “vested in the enemy’s adherent,”—there is nothing 
“left in the person whose estate had been confiscated.”213 The Court still 
refused to express an opinion as to “where the fee dwells.”214  
But such an answer could not satisfy background property principles, 
and other questions soon arose. Heirs argued that if the fee resided in the 
United States and not the original owner, then the debts of the owner did 
not attach to the property—a position that the Court, somewhat 
unsatisfactorily, rebuffed.215 More importantly, after the various rounds 
of amnesty for former rebels were completed, survivors sought 
reinstatement of property, pursuant to Armstrong. 
The Court finally resolved these questions in Illinois Central 
Railroad Company v. Bosworth, decisively concluding (along the lines of 
Armstrong) that the Act did not separate property and the individual.216 
For, as the Court explained, if “[t]here is no corruption of blood[,] the 
offender can transmit by descent . . . [and] his heirs take from him by 
descent.”217 Accordingly, vesting of the property remained unaffected—
“the dormant and suspended fee . . . continues in” the original owner.218  
The task of the Court was difficult—even as it accepted the radical 
conception of rebel property as free floating, capable of being guilty on 
its own, it had to deal with traditional constitutional principles that treated 
property as vested, as connected with someone, and that allowed 
divestment and the rupture of this connection only upon a proper trial. 
This traditional connectedness account required the Court to situate “the 
disembodied shade of naked ownership . . . during the period of its 
ambiguous existence” in something or someone.219 These property 
interests “could not have been floating in space without relationship to 
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any one.”220 The Court ultimately reaffirmed a connectedness account of 
ownership. 
The lesson to be taken from these cases then is this: Ownership of 
rights resided in the individual; taking rights away once they were vested 
fundamentally affected the individual and offended related constitutional 
guarantees, and was therefore disfavored. Indeed, the vestedness concept 
and the corruption of blood metaphor are not the only early modern 
legal examples of the understanding of property as grounded in a 
person’s being and existence. Changes in an individual’s being affected 
their ownership of property. For example, after marriage, a husband and 
wife became “one person in law, so that the very being and existence of 
the woman is suspended during the coverture, or entirely merged and 
incorporated in that of the husband.”221 This “unity of person” meant that 
the property of the wife became “vested in the husband.”222 And if 
changes in an individual’s personhood could affect the way in which he 
owned property, then the reverse was true—the vesting of property could 
work changes to intrinsic aspects of an individual. Thus, if a lord “granted 
[a villein]” property, it implicitly gave freedom to the villein (or serf) 
because such ownership “vests an ownership in him entirely inconsistent 
with his former state of bondage.”223 
B. Doctrinal Aspects of Vestedness and the Connectedness 
Approach to Ownership 
The most prominent modern context in which courts explicitly 
disfavor rights revocation is in the context of the vested rights doctrine. 
The doctrine was once, as Edward Corwin famously put it, the basic 
doctrine of constitutional law.224 Indeed, the doctrine made an appearance 
in many blockbuster antebellum cases. Thus, in Marbury v. Madison,225 
the Court found that Marbury had “a vested legal right” in the office of 
magistrate.226 In Kendall v. United States, which began the process of 
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judicial authority.” Id. at 167. The question of vested rights in public offices received further examination in 
subsequent cases. See Woolhandler, supra note 24, at 1031. See also Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury Mystery: 
Why Did William Marbury Sue in the Supreme Court?, 18 Const. Comment. 607 (2001). 
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laying out the limits of presidential control over executive officers, one 
argument advanced against following the President’s direction was that 
vested rights would be lost.227 Ogden v. Saunders, the basis of all bankruptcy 
law, held that these laws do not violate vested rights.228 
The doctrine is, in some measure, a successor to the vestedness 
concept described in the previous Subpart, and perhaps a cousin of the 
corruption of blood metaphor, both of which rely on the understanding 
of ownership as connectedness. Rather than focus on the historical 
evolution of the doctrine that scholars have attempted elsewhere,229 this 
Article focuses on its analytical underpinnings. As this Article explains, 
the doctrinal principles that distinguish vested rights from nonvested 
rights aim to measure how connected a right is to the person who holds 
it. At the outset, not every right is vested, of course—some rights are 
insufficiently connected with and constitutive of the individual to be 
considered vested. Courts generally express this point in similar ways—
according to one court, “a right has not vested until it is ‘so far perfected 
that it cannot be taken away by legislation,’ and so ‘complete and 
unconditional’ that it ‘may be equated with a property interest.’”230 
Similarly, as Chapman and McConnell argue, vested rights are “marked 
by finality” and are “conclusively acquired,” as opposed to mere 
expectations.231 
But what marks “finality,” “perfection” or “conclusiveness”? This is 
a fraught question. Indeed, Kainen argues that this question proved so 
problematic that courts backed away from the vested rights doctrine 
altogether.232 To take Perry as an example, why could one not conclude 
that the right to marry is so bound up with someone’s being that even for 
unmarried individuals, the right to marry had already vested, just like the 
relationships of couples that had already married? Under the case law, 
vesting depends on three conditions: time, reliance, and completion of 
formalities. As I discuss in the next Subpart, each of these criteria are 
meant to measure the degree of connectedness between the individual 
and the right. With the right amount of time, reliance, and completion of 
formalities, the right becomes part of the individual. 
Hence, once the right vests, it appears to become part of the individual, 
no matter the legal regime. The right “travels” with the individual, even 
if the law initially giving her the right is abrogated or is no longer in 
 
 227. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524 (1838). For the importance of Kendall, see Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–
1861, 117 Yale L.J. 1568 (2008). 
 228. 25 U.S. 213 (1827). 
 229. See, e.g., Kainen, supra note 18. 
 230. Dardeen v. Heartland Manor, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ill. 1999) (quoting First Co. v. Armstead, 
664 N.E.2d 36, (Ill. 1996)).   
 231. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 20, at 1737. 
 232. Kainen, supra note 28, at 443–46. 
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effect. Unlike substantive due process rights, as one court recently put it, 
“[a] vested right may be derived from a statute or the common law, but 
‘once it vests it is no longer dependent for its assertion upon the common 
law or statute under which it may have been acquired.’”233 A change in 
the distributive scheme of rights and benefits—as in the case of Proposition 
8, which took the general right to marry away from same-sex couples—
leaves unaffected a vested right because the right is now embedded in the 
individual who holds it. Thus vested rights historically also played a role 
in conflict of laws analysis—when an individual with a vested rights travels 
to a new jurisdiction with a different distributive scheme, they continue to 
possess the right as if they were in the previous jurisdiction. Indeed, 
scholars treat classical vested rights/retroactivity issues as raising inter-
temporal conflicts of laws.234 
1. Doctrinal Criteria of Vestedness 
Traditional vested rights in contract and property obtain when 
formalities are complete. More recently, legislatures have imposed time 
minimums—that is, an individual must hold an interest, in pensions for 
example, for a certain period of time for it to vest.235 Finally, courts also 
look to the reliance interests of the individual.236 Vested interests generally 
obtain (when there are no contracts) when an individual relies on a right 
over some period of time. Thus, individuals may invoke longstanding uses of 
land to defend against rezoning, or invoke rights in statutes of limitations 
against claims.237 All approaches relate to the degree of the connection 
between an object and an individual. 
The time based approach intuitively relates to how objects connect 
to individuals. In most cases, the longer I possess an object, other factors 
being equal, the more intertwined it becomes to my sense of being, and 
 
 233. City of Golden v. Parker, 138 P.3d 285, 290 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Ficarra v. Dep’t of 
Regulatory Agencies, Div. of Ins., 849 P.2d 6, 15 (Colo. 1993)).  
 234. See, e.g., Francis Wharton, Retrospective Legislation and Grangerism, 3 Int’l Rev. 50, 53 
(1876) (“Laws may conflict not only because they emanate from rival sovereigns, each striving to 
possess the particular case, but because they emanate from distinct periods of time, each of which may 
claim to embrace the case in question within its sanctions.”); Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” 
and Choice of Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1191, 1194 (1987). 
 235. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 195 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining what 
equities come into play when evaluating congressional purpose regarding vesting). 
 236. City of Elgin v. All Nations Worship Ctr., 890 N.E.2d 853, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“[W]hen a 
party expends substantial time and effort attempting to comply with an ordinance as it then exists and 
the legislative body amends the ordinance, the party may acquire a vested right to proceed under the 
old ordinance.” (citation omitted)). 
 237. Dane, supra note 234, at 1194 (statute of limitations defense is a vested right); 51 Am. Jur. 2d 
Limitation of Actions § 17 (2015) (identifying property law’s special protection for existing uses, 
exploring possible justifications for this protection, and arguing that none can support the strong protection 
that existing uses currently enjoy); Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use 
Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1222 (2009). 
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the harder it is for me to part with it. Similarly, (and relatedly), when I 
rely on the fact that I possess an object or certain right, and use it on a 
regular basis, it is more likely that I will consider it closely linked to me, 
and imagine it as playing a role in future life projects and plans. Reliance 
is also, therefore, a measure of the connection between the object and 
the individual. A right or object that has played a sufficient role in an 
individual’s life such that an individual has taken action based upon the 
right is entitled to greater protection. 
The formality based approach, however, requires more explanation. 
Under this approach, a right vests only when the formalities are complete. 
Some examples from the heyday of antebellum vested rights litigation 
are instructive. In Marbury, for example, “certain solemnities [were] 
required by law” including “the sign manual of the President, and the 
seal of the United States,” for Marbury’s commission to vest.238 Similarly, 
government land grants, the subject of Fletcher, typically required 
formalities.239 Finally, existence of valid contractual rights requires certain 
formalities be met.240 Even after the reach of the Court’s vested rights 
doctrine diminished, these contract rights continued to be protected as 
vested under the Contract Clause.241 
Although the conclusion is less intuitively apparent, like the time 
and reliance based approaches, formalities also help “connect” the right, 
or, in the case of property transfer, the object, with the promisee in three 
ways: (1) causing the promisee to deliberate and cogitate over the benefits 
of the bargain; (2) lending legal weight and legitimacy to the promisee’s 
interest; and (3) recognizing the exercise of will, the autonomy, and 
dignity of the promisee. Each of these aspects of formalizing the contract 
buttress each other, although they are analytically distinct.  
 
 238. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 159–60 (1803). 
 239. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 741 (10th Cir. 2005); 
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810). As the Court explained in Fletcher, certain legislative acts, such as 
grants of land or charters to provide public services, were “in [their] nature[,] a contract,” such that “absolute 
rights have vested under that contract, [and] a repeal of the law cannot devest those rights.” Id. Where 
states enter into transactions—sales of land in Fletcher, or employment of officers, accompanied (at the 
time) with bonds from sureties, as in Marbury, those transactions take on the role of bargained-for 
contracts, which, due to their similarities with traditional contract, cannot be repudiated. 
 240. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1941). 
 241. Kainen, supra note 28, at 431. Notably, however, the early antebellum cases did not invoke 
the clause—as the scholarly debate and the judicial confusion suggests, the Court’s vested rights doctrine 
does not admit of an easy textual explanation. Id. at 445. 
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a. Deliberative Function 
Lon Fuller, whose half-century-old article still remains a leading 
authority on formalities in contract law,242 expanded on the deliberative 
role they play. His focus, unlike mine, is on formalities from the point of 
view of the party that takes on a burden. He (following others before 
him) explained that when parties fit their behavior within legal formalities, 
they “will tend also to make apparent to the party the consequences of 
his action and will suggest deliberation where deliberation is needed.”243 
The purpose, ultimately, is to ensure that an individual takes on a 
contractual burden after careful consideration. Similarly, another 
contemporary article explained that the “ceremonial” aspects of a 
transfer “impress[] the transferor with the significance of his statements 
and thus justify[] the court in reaching the conclusion, if the ceremonial is 
performed, that [the statements] were deliberately intended to be 
operative.”244  
My purposes require holding a mirror up to Fuller’s argument, 
focusing on the benefits from the point of view of the promisee, to whom 
the benefits connect and in whom they vest. When parties enter a 
contract, they deliberate, not just over the cost of entering the contract—
Fuller’s focus—but also on the benefits of the contract to them. The cost, 
psychological wrenches, and other burdens that the individual takes on 
are measured against the benefit she expects to get. The individual 
considers (or at least, should consider) what it is she is giving up, the role 
that the right or item plays in her existence, against the potential benefits 
and ramifications of getting the new right or object through the contract 
or exchange. Thus, in the case of a large purchase—of a house, for 
example—with multiple formalities, these formalities ensure that a buyer 
carefully considers whether to give up savings or take on a mortgage as 
Fuller envisages; but the buyer measures this against the role a new home 
will play in her life. These formalities, and the resulting deliberation—
involving careful consideration of both benefit and cost—give the sensation 
of a deprivation when the other party reneges on a contract. The promisee 
had contemplated the benefit of the contract, and integrated it into the 
narrative of her life. Thus, it is the formalities, and deliberation that arise 
from these formalities that help develop a connection between the 
would-be owner and the object; they help the object vest. This level of 
 
 242. Curtis Bridgeman, Default Rules, Penalty Default Rules, and New Formalism, 33 Fla. St. U. 
L. Rev. 683, 687 (2006). 
 243. Fuller, supra note 240, at 803. 
 244. Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 Yale L.J. 
1, 4 (1941); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 495 
(1975) (“The execution of the will is made into a ceremony impressing the participants with its solemnity 
and legal significance.”).  
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deliberation does not exist, for example, when a non-contractual right, 
such as a right against a tortious act, is involved. 
b. Legitimizing Function 
Second, legal formalities provide the promisee’s claim of ownership 
in the contractual right with a sense of legitimacy, which bolsters the sense 
of vestedness right. Legal metaphors play a powerful role in helping 
individuals feel connected to certain interests. As Pierce notes, 
“psychological ownership also is further facilitated by the ‘possession rituals’ 
. . . . [R]ituals such as displaying, showing off, using, and personalizing 
possessions facilitate the movement of the culturally prescribed meaning 
of objects to the individual’s self-identity.”245 
The contract is a legal ritual. Formalities help frame the parties’ 
interest in the transaction. To be sure, when individuals recognize their 
actions as carrying legal import, backed by state power, they are more 
likely to deliberate to ensure that they wish to incur a burden that can be 
coercively enforced. However, the contractual right is understood, not 
just as a matter of raw power—framing the transaction they have engaged 
in as legal also brings to their interest an aura of legitimacy, a sense of “I 
deserve this as a right.” Because this point is best made clear in a specific 
context, I shall return to it at the end of the Subpart, where I consider the 
role this understanding plays in the same-sex marriage debate. 
c. Bargaining and Dignity Recognition 
Finally, formalities ensure that the contract is a bargained-for 
exchange, and hence, that it is intimately connected to an exercise of will 
by the promisee. This creates a sense of community between the promisor 
and promisee. Both philosophical and empirical accounts support this 
deep connection between the contractual right and the promisee, and 
therefore, suggest that formally created contractual rights vest because of 
their intimate connection to personhood. 
Under the philosophical account, formalities and related doctrines 
help denote vested rights because they are relevant to ensuring that the 
contract is a bargained-for exchange. On Daniel Markovits’s account, 
contracts as bargained-for exchanges do more than facilitate the efficient 
exchange of goods—they create a “respectful community” between 
promisor and promisee that implicate the personhood of both parties.246 
When a promisor makes a promise to provide a good, or behave in a 
certain manner, she adopts the promisee’s ends as her own. By adopting 
the promisee’s ends as her own, the promisor respects the promisee, and 
submits to her will, and in so doing, treats her as an end in herself (and 
 
 245. Pierce et al., supra note 63, at 96. 
 246. Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 Yale L.J. 1417, 1432 (2004). 
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vice versa). This mutual submission creates a community based in the 
common ends the promisee and promisor share through the contract—
the benefits of the contract demarcate the bounds of the community. 
As Markovits explains, the consideration doctrine, or other related 
(and required) formalities that indicate that the contract was a bargained-
for exchange, ensures that the promisee played an active role in the 
exchange.247 When the promisee is passive, she exercises no will of her 
own—the promisor presumes or hypothesizes the promisee’s ends and 
acts accordingly. This does not create the mutual community which 
Markovits argues underlies contract theory. But when the promisee 
actively identifies an end to which the promisor submits, the promisee 
engages in developing the community. As Markovits shows, contract 
doctrines seek primarily to ensure the existence of an active promisee.248 
The meaning, then, of a bargained-for exchange, is the promisor’s 
submission to the ends, and ultimately, to the will, of the promisee, in the 
context of providing a specific contractual right. The right vests, under 
this account, not just because it is a part of the promisee’s life narrative 
or plans, or because the promisee relied on it, but because it represents 
the will of the promisee, a recognition of the promisee as an end in 
herself. Breaking the promise, and depriving the promisee of the 
contractual right, does not just betray the sense of community created, 
but also disrespects the promisee. 
Lest this approach seem more metaphysical than realistic, it bears 
mentioning that as an empirical matter, individuals, even in commercial 
situations, value contractual performance far more than the performance 
is actually worth.249 More to the point, these experiments suggest that 
breach is considered to impose dignitary harms, such as betrayal and loss 
of trust, upon the promisee.250  
 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 1487. 
 249. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1003 (2010). 
 250. To be sure, experiments that show that loss in contract are seen as more harmful than loss in 
tort do not necessarily prove dignitary harm. Id. at 1024. Rather, as suggested above, it may merely 
mean that the promisee has fit the promise within her life, and maybe made plans in reliance on the 
promise. While this shows vesting, it is not the vesting that creates dignitary harms when the right is 
withdrawn. 
  However, if the right were important only because of the role it would play in the promisee’s 
life, then contractual non-performance should be a greater blow in any case: the reason for non-
performance should be irrelevant. However, the experiments show that promisees explicitly take into 
account the reason for non-performance. Experiments also show that promisees are more willing to 
accept non-performance due to promisor mistake rather than deliberate non-performance, mainly 
because the latter disrespects the promisee more than the former. The point is that the formally 
bargained-for contractual right is bonded to the promisor; the promisor’s attitude toward that right is 
an indicator of the promisor’s attitude toward the promisee herself. The formal right is not just bound 
up in the promisee’s life plans, but signifies, in that context, the promisee’s dignitary standing. Rights 
produced by formalistic bargaining thus are of key importance in determining vestedness. 
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My purpose here is merely to show that vestedness requires 
consideration of the connection between the right and its owner. 
However, this does not provide all the doctrinal answers: connection is a 
matter of degree, and it is not always clear when a right is sufficiently 
connected to be vested. The dilemma is clear with respect to each aspect 
of the doctrine—how much time or reliance, or what kind of formalities, 
are enough to establish the degree of connectedness for vesting to occur? 
Further, the nature of the connection may differ from right to right—
some rights are constitutive of identity; others help define aspects of self 
that extend beyond one’s identity or social role; and yet others (as we 
shall see in the next Subpart) are important for instrumental reasons, not 
themselves constitutive of identity, but helping us achieve other goals 
that are important to develop our personhood. 
The antebellum Court similarly encountered problems regarding the 
boundaries of formal contract. The Court treated certain legislative 
grants of rights, including corporate charter grants, as contractual, and 
therefore, vested, and others as purely legislative subject to legislative 
change. The Court thereby created a thicket, where litigants and 
legislatures were unsure which laws were “locked in” and which were 
subject to change. The Court slowly retreated from treating corporate 
charters, for example, as contracts between the state and private entities. 
As the antebellum period progressed, the Court drew a firm line with the 
Contract Clause, protecting only contracts (or very similar enactments) to 
prevent such ambiguity.251 But doctrinal problems still remain. Hopefully, 
by providing an underlying rationale for vested rights doctrine, this 
analysis will help guide future doctrine. 
2. Vested Rights Applied: The Same-Sex Marriage Cases 
Each of the criteria—time, reliance, and formalities—present their 
own vexing questions. For example, a question may arise as to what time 
period should count toward the vesting: in the case of a pension benefit, 
one could conceivably calculate the vesting period in various ways, dating 
from the date of hire, the employment start date, or the date of the first 
pension contribution, to the date of the last contribution, the date of 
departure, or the date of cessation of benefits. However, legislative or 
organizational policies often set such vesting rules, which are generally 
unambiguous except at the margins. By contrast, while time-vesting rules 
are usually specified, whether reasonable reliance vests a right may rely 
on a host of factors that are not similarly spelled out, but approached (I 
think correctly) in an ad hoc fact-specific fashion. Whether there is reliance 
and the reliance is reasonable, therefore, depends on facts on the ground, 
about which it is difficult to theorize ex ante, and regarding which there 
 
 251. Kainen, supra note 28, at 423. 
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is ample (if not entirely clear) guidance.252 At any rate, these questions 
usually arise only in specialized areas of law, and are not included in this 
more general treatment. 
Compared to the doctrine on vesting through time or reliance 
interests, the doctrine on vesting through formalities is less clear. Yet, the 
question has recently entered the constitutional mainstream in the marriage 
litigation context. Determining what formalities vest a right is also a 
context-based determination—in Marbury, for example, Chief Justice 
Marshall had no trouble determining that the affixing of the seal to 
Marbury’s commission vested his right to the commission. But in other 
circumstances, tradition and positive law may fall short. Marriage 
equality litigation presents a useful contemporary and mainstream 
investigation of the undertheorized role formalities play in vesting rights. 
At the time of writing, plaintiffs married between the invalidation of 
a same-sex marriage ban by the district court refusing to stay its 
judgment and the subsequent staying of a judgment by a higher court, 
filed lawsuits in three states.253 These states seek to refuse to recognize 
these marriages. In all of these cases, the plaintiffs argue that even 
though the law no longer permits same-sex marriage, because the higher 
court stayed the district court orders invalidating the marriages, their 
marriages remain valid. 
The most legally developed case (albeit now moot)254 and the only 
one in which an opinion has been issued at the time of writing, is the case 
arising in Utah, where the district court struck down the marriage bans 
on December 20, 2013, without staying its ruling.255 The Supreme Court 
stayed the ruling on January 6, 2014.256 During this nearly one-year gap, 
some 300 same-sex couples married. In Evans v. Utah, the district court 
held that the marriages had to be recognized.257 After providing some 
 
 252. These questions generally arise only where zoning ordinances are in question. Courts analyze 
the behavior of the agency, the rights holder, the stage of the development of the project, and the nature 
and scope of the right sought in determining whether there was reasonable reliance. Zoning: Proof of 
Vested Right to Complete Development Project, 35 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 385 provides an excellent 
overview of some of these considerations. 
 253. Bloechl-Karlsen v. Walker—Freedom to Marry in Wisconsin, Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 
https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/bloechl-karlsen-v-walker (last updated Sept. 17, 2014); Caspar v. Snyder, 
No. 14-cv-11499, 2015 WL 224741 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2015); Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192 
(D. Utah 2014). 
 254. The Tenth Circuit granted appellant’s motion to dismiss. See Evans v. Utah, No. 14-04060 
(10th Cir. Oct. 8, 2014) (order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss). However, the arguments in the 
other cases are, so far, identical to those made in Utah. 
 255. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013). 
 256. Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014), aff’d, 755 F. 3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert denied, 
135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).  
 257. This case is now moot because the Tenth Circuit found in favor of plaintiffs in Kitchen v. Herbert, 
775 F.3d 1193. However, in Michigan and Wisconsin, where the Sixth Circuit upheld marriage bans, the 
litigation remains active.  
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general background, the court began its discussion of the case itself with 
a description of the couples. This description focused on the formalities and 
rituals that characterized the couples’ marriages. The sentence with 
which the court introduced each set of plaintiffs began with the plaintiffs’ 
names, and concluded with “obtained” (or “got”) “their marriage license 
and solemnized their marriage.”258 The court noted other ceremonies and 
licenses where appropriate. According to the court, the first set of plaintiffs 
had “performed a commitment ceremony in May 2009, even though the 
State of Utah did not recognize the union,” and then got their license in 
2013.259 The next set of plaintiffs received a marriage license from 
Washington D.C. in 2010, and then Utah in 2013.260 That license was used 
in a court proceeding seeking a birth certificate for their son, on which 
both (rather than just one) parent was listed.261 The third set of plaintiffs 
had had a religious ceremony in 2007 and obtained medical power of 
attorney.262 The final couple celebrated the Sunday after Thanksgiving as 
their wedding anniversary since one of the couple had proposed marriage 
on that day in 1992.263 
Recall the three ways in which formalities achieve vesting: (1) 
encouraging deliberation resulting in reliance, (2) creating a sense of 
legitimate entitlement to the right in question, and (3) recognizing the 
mutual dignity of both promisees. The court’s exhaustive listing of the 
various formalities the couples had completed, emphasized the first and 
third of these functions. First, the facts established the dignitary aspects 
of the marriage contract. After describing the rituals and legal forms that 
characterize the couples’ relationships, the court continued by detailing 
the mutual commitments the couples made to each other. The partner in 
one couple sought to share the responsibility of child rearing with his 
partner. A partner in the second couple sought to help her partner with 
her medical issues.264 The third sought to provide health insurance 
coverage for his partner.265 The rituals constituted recognition of each 
others’ needs as important, and a promise to respect these needs and 
adopt them as shared goals. Disrupting commitments entered into after 
such solemn rituals would be perceived as a greater blow to the partner’s 
dignity and a greater ethical breach than if the ritual had never taken place. 
Implicit in the court’s discussion is also the idea that marriages were 
entered to with great deliberation. The second sentence of the court’s 
 
 258. Evans, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1198. 
 259. Id. at 1199.  
 260. Id. at 1198. 
 261. Utah recognizes joint adoption by unmarried individuals only in limited circumstances. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-6-117(4) (West 2015). 
 262. Evans, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1199. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Evans, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1199. 
 265. Id. 
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descriptions of each couple listed the (in the case of each couple, 
substantial) lengths of the relationship. The premarriage ceremonies, 
followed by the marriage ritual, were the product of long standing 
deliberation. This is not quite the same as the decision to enter marriage 
producing the deliberation as I describe above. But because of the 
court’s description, the marriage ritual became imbued with the weight of 
the couple’s relationship. One would be hard pressed to describe these 
marriages as unplanned or accomplished with limited forethought. In 
getting married, the couples contemplated and deliberately sought specific 
benefits: “Plaintiffs began to exercise the rights associated with such 
valid marriages . . . .”266 Revoking the vested marriage rights “‘would 
disrupt thousands of actions taken in reliance on the [prior court ruling] 
by these same-sex couples, their employers, their creditors, and many 
others, throwing property rights into disarray, destroying the legal interests 
and expectations of thousands of couples and their families.’”267 The various 
rights involved therefore amounted to “‘undermining the ability of 
citizens to plan their lives according to the law.’”268 
The court’s recounting of the facts, of course, shaped its analysis. 
Based on the facts, which, as recounted, illustrated the deliberation-
inducing and dignity-inducing role of the formalities, it concluded that 
the marriages had vested. In its analysis section, the court returned to the 
vested rights doctrine. It explained: The “marriages were authorized by 
law at the time they occurred. The marriages were solemnized and valid 
under the existing law so that nothing remained to be done. No separate 
step can or must be taken after solemnization for the rights of a marriage 
to vest.”269 The right “‘ar[o]se[] upon a contract’”; thus, “‘the repeal of 
the statute does not affect it’” as it “‘stands independent of the statute’” 
and the right is “sacred.”270 This solemnization meant that individuals 
could rely on the “right to family integrity, the right to the custody and 
care of children of that marriage—that the State cannot take away 
regardless of the procedures the State uses.”271 Thus, “the State’s 
application of the marriage bans to place Plaintiffs’ marriages ‘on hold,’ 
necessarily ‘takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing 
law,’” which is invalid.272 
The court’s reasoning was strongest when it came to describing the 
dignitary-inducing and deliberation- (and therefore, reliance) inducing 
roles of ritual. But Utah took square aim at whether the ritual could have 
 
 266. Id. at 1206. 
 267. Id. at 1204 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 268. Id. (citation omitted). 
 269. Id. at 1206.  
 270. Id. (citing and quoting Tufts v. Tufts, 30 P. 309, 310–11 (Utah 1892)). 
 271. Id. at 1208.  
 272. Id. at 1206.  
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created a sense of legitimate entitlement by arguing that the marriages were 
never legitimate in the first place.273 The State argued that while plaintiffs 
may have carried out a marriage ceremony, these were not legitimate, 
legally recognized formalities,274 because they were not the result of a 
“final judgment.”275 They argued that only a final judgment, rather than 
an appealable ruling, could serve to change the law in such a way that 
carrying out formalities or rituals in prescription with that ruling could vest 
a right. Further, the State also argued that even if the nonfinal judgment 
changed the law, the marriages, while legal at the time they were carried 
out, did not create vested rights. The Supreme Court’s stay of the district 
court’s injunction prevented any vesting. Utah’s reasoning on this point 
is not pellucid. It appears to argue that because the stay returned parties 
to the status quo ante,276 it could not have “left Plaintiffs with a ‘vested 
right.’” Rather, the stay retroactively drained all legal force from the 
district court’s decision, such that it never had any force of law. Hence, 
any rituals conducted pursuant to that decision were retroactively 
drained of legal force, as if the decision had never existed.277 “Thus,” 
argued the State, “even if the district court were correct . . . that Utah’s 
marriage laws became a ‘legal nullity’” after it issued the injunction and 
the injunction became the law, “any rights that might otherwise vest once 
that order becomes final are still subject to legal changes.”278 
In focusing on the legitimacy of the ritual, the State tried to 
downplay the importance of the marriage formality itself. “The issuance 
of marriage licenses” is merely a “ministerial act required by the [court] 
decision, not some intervening or supervening cause of the Plaintiff’s 
marital status.”279 Because the legitimacy of the ritual was questionable, 
the ritual itself could not embody the deliberative and reliance functions 
I outline above: “Plaintiffs were on notice—and may well have known” 
 
 273. The state made three other arguments. The first two do not squarely implicate the existence 
of vested rights, and relate to whether the statute should be read to apply retroactively and the policy 
implications of giving legal force to district court opinions that had not been stayed. Neither figured 
prominently in the court’s analysis, and I do not address them. The third has to do with the scope of the 
vested right that I address in Part III. 
 274. My presentation of this point relies on the approach of H.L.A. Hart. To put it simply, my second 
order rule corresponds to Hart’s rule of recognition that determines which precepts should be recognized 
as a binding legal rules. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 91 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 
2d ed. 1994). 
 275. I rely on the Supreme Court briefing, which is the best explication of the parties’ argument. 
Emergency Application to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal at 14, Herbert v. Evans, No. 14A65 
(July 16, 2014) (emphasis in original). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Although no party makes this connection, I consider this argument identical to that of 
Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th 1055 (2004), where the California Supreme 
Court held that marriages performed without state sanction lacked legal force. 
 278. Emergency Application, supra note 275, at 16. 
 279. Id. at 18. 
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that Utah was appealing the invalidation of an existing state ban that 
enjoyed a “presumption of correctness.”280 
In response, plaintiffs (and the lower court) argued, I think 
persuasively, that the district court’s holding did change the law, and that 
rights that vested under the law as it existed at the time, permanently 
vested, just as if the vesting had occurred pursuant to a statute. First, a 
district court’s injunction, they noted, has the force of law; property 
obtained as the result of transactions into which others, especially, as in 
this case, third parties who were not parties to the case, enter into on the 
basis of the injunction, vest.281 Thus, in bankruptcy proceedings, for 
example, transactions that third-party creditors may carry out as the 
result of a holding cannot be undone.282 Even the relevant government 
officials recognized that the marriages were carried out pursuant to 
law—as the Attorney General noted, “‘marriages between persons of the 
same sex were recognized in the State of Utah between the dates of 
December 20, 2013 until the stay on January 6, 2014. Based on our 
analysis of Utah law, the marriages were recognized at the time the 
ceremony was completed.’”283 Given that the “fundamental change in 
legal status” that a marriage works is at least comparable to the effect of 
a “commercial transaction,” the vesting of the marriage right must be 
recognized.284 Accordingly, no appellate stay can divest the right. A stay 
cannot turn back time. Indeed, to obtain a stay of the district court’s 
ruling permitting same-sex marriage, the state would have had to argue 
that without a stay, it would suffer irreparable harm. The very premise of 
there being “irreparable harm” is that the district court’s ruling would 
result in a legally imposed harm that cannot be undone as part of the 
regular appellate process.285 Because the law had changed once an 
injunction had issued, the formality held a legitimate basis; therefore, a 
vested right was created that the appellate process by itself could not 
divest. The Supreme Court ultimately declined to grant the relief that 
Utah sought.  
 
 280. Id. at 10, 15. 
 281. Respondents’ Opposition to Application to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal at 
13, Evans v. Utah, 135 S. Ct. 16 (2014) (No. 14A65).  
 282. Id.  
 283. Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting letter from Utah Attorney 
General Sean Reyes to county attorneys and county clerks). 
 284. Respondents’ Opposition, supra note 281, at 17. 
 285. Evans, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1210. 
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C. Vestedness Outside the Vestedness Context 
1. Other Contexts Where Rights Connect 
The explicit role of the vested rights doctrine in the marriage cases 
is a bit of an anomaly. As the distributive approach to ownership, embodied 
in substantive due process, gained ascendance at the turn of the century,286 
the vested rights doctrine became cabined to specialized doctrinal areas. 
However, the long established role that the connectedness approach 
played in our jurisprudence meant that in many contexts, the dominant 
distributional approach would adopt as its guide notions of connectedness, 
recognizing already possessed rights as more fundamental to individual 
existence, without formal or explicit invocation of connectedness-related 
doctrines. The clearest example is in the case of welfare benefits, where 
the refusal to provide rights comes under less scrutiny than taking away 
benefits once given. In his seminal article on the then-new benefits 
jurisprudence, Charles Reich anticipated this approach.287 As he observed 
regarding government distributed benefits, “the exact nature of the 
government action” involving the benefit “makes a great difference.”288 
Government action may take the form of a “denial of the right to apply, 
denial of an application . . . suspension or revocation of a grant, or some 
other sanction.”289 Although the doctrine had not solidified, Reich claimed 
that, “[i]n general, courts tend to afford the greatest measure of protection 
in revocation or suspension cases,”290 rather than losses involving denials. 
Less than a decade later, the Court converted Reich’s observation 
into hard doctrine. After setting in place protections for termination of 
welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly,291 the Court declined to similarly 
protect denials of applications for benefits a year later.292 Faced with an 
initial denial of disability benefits in Richardson v. Perales, the Court 
distinguished Kelly, noting merely that, “Kelly, however, had to do with 
termination of AFDC benefits without prior notice. . . . [(In Perales, we)] are 
not concerned with termination of disability benefits once granted. Neither 
are we concerned with a change of status without notice.”293 Courts have 
relied on Perales (again, to my knowledge, without reasoning) to hold 
that an initial denial of benefits does not merit due process.294 
 
 286. Kainen, supra note 18, at 142 (describing the rise of substantive due process). 
 287. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).  
 288. Id. at 744. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 292. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
 293. Id. at 406–07 (emphasis added). 
 294. See, e.g., Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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The best explanation for this approach lies in a throwaway comment 
of Reich’s: “The theory seems to be that [in cases of revocation] some 
sort of rights have ‘vested,’”295 an explanation, or rather, an analogy, 
upon which courts and scholars have similarly relied.296 But the Court did 
not invoke the time, reliance, or formality factors of typical vested rights 
analysis. Rather, it pointed to the nature of the benefit to explain why the 
benefit was deeply intertwined with its recipient’s life. As the Goldberg 
Court explained, the loss is “grievous”297: “[T]he crucial factor in” 
Goldberg was “that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy 
over eligibility [might have] deprive[d] an eligible recipient of the very 
means by which to live while [s]he wait[ed].”298 This impinges upon 
important personhood interests—not just in life itself, but also in 
developing as a human being. “Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of 
subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same 
opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in 
the life of the community.”299 By contrast, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the 
Court sanctioned a lesser degree of protection for disability benefits than 
welfare benefits, noting, “[T]he hardship imposed upon the erroneously 
terminated disability recipient may be significant. . . . [but the] disabled 
worker’s need is likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient.”300 Thus, 
benefits can develop connections with their recipients, not just because 
of reliance, time, or formality, but also because of their nature.301 
Relatedly, in some cases, the Court has held that some benefits are 
simply too inchoate to count as interests that merit Goldberg type 
hearings, even if they are being taken away. In such cases, the Court 
looks to state law to see if the interest is clearly defined as a property 
right.302 A court may also consider reasonable expectations of the parties 
with respect to the benefit or right.303 Both considerations relate to the 
degree of connectedness between the benefit and the owner. An interest 
that I do not consider a right, nor expect to retain, is not one to which I 
would be closely connected. 
 
 295. Reich, supra note 287, at 744. 
 296. Courts have also referred to benefits as vested rights. See, e.g., Kelly Kare, Ltd. v. O’Rourke, 
930 F.2d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 297. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263. 
 298. Id. at 263–64 (emphasis added). 
 299. Id. at 265. 
 300. 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976). 
 301. Recall that moral theorists are likely to pick rights that are considered connected to an individual 
because of their nature as human or civil rights that all individuals possess in the distributive sense. But this 
does not, as discussed above, diminish their importance on a connectedness account. 
 302. See, e.g., Kelly Kare, Ltd. v. O’Rourke, 930 F.2d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 1991) (interest not choate 
enough to constitute a vested right). 
 303. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 258 U.S. 338 (1922); Charles B. Hochman, The 
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1960). 
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The “new property,” includes under its umbrella interests ranging 
from jobs, entitlements, occupational licenses, contracts, subsidies, as 
well as intangible property that are the product of labor, time, and 
creativity, such as intellectual property, business goodwill, and enhanced 
earning potential from graduate degrees.304 As Reich observed, the new 
property “takes the form of rights or status rather than of tangible goods” 
(though, as I argue above, so does the “old” property).305 Scholars have 
linked this notion of property to interests such as family relationships 
and even racial identity.306 It is therefore unsurprising that the non-
retrogression principle has wandered into other areas of doctrine as well. 
2. NFIB v. Sebelius 
The Affordable Care Act case, National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius,307 is a good, contemporary example of anti-rights-
retrogression principles where the vested rights doctrine is not formally 
involved. There, the Supreme Court struck down a major provision of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that required states to 
expand Medicaid provision. In this case, private plaintiffs and numerous 
states challenged two major provisions of President Obama’s landmark 
legislation. The first provision imposed a tax on individuals who did not 
purchase health insurance, which a bare majority of the Court upheld. 
The second required states to expand Medicaid to a broad swath of 
individuals who previously did not receive benefits by raising income 
limits or risk losing federal funding. A supermajority of the Court, in an 
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justices Breyer and 
Kagan joined, and another opinion written jointly by Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito, held that this was unconstitutional coercion 
on the part of Congress. This holding was historic—it was the first time 
that the Court had found conditions Congress imposed on the receipt of 
federal funds coercive. As Mitchell Berman points out, the Medicaid 
holding was “the most potentially significant” of the Court’s holdings in 
that case—and “the one supported by the least clear rationale.”308 The 
most coherent rationale for the invalidation involves contract law-like 
principles and vested rights-like analysis. This understanding makes the 
majority approach stronger. 
What troubled the Justices most was the threat to take away federal 
funding, even though they agreed that the federal government was not 
 
 304. Joseph W. Singer, Re-reading Property, 27 New Eng. L. Rev. 711, 722–23 (1992). 
 305. Reich, supra note 287, at 738. 
 306. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993); David A. Super, A 
New New Property, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1773 (2013). 
 307. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 308. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 
1283, 1285 (2013). 
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obliged to provide the funding in the first place. The facts and arguments 
on which the opinions relied centered on two points introduced by the 
Chief Justice’s controlling opinion.309 First, Spending Clause legislation is 
“much in the nature of a contract,” and the State must “voluntarily and 
knowingly accept[] the terms of the ‘contract.’”310 The second point is 
about coercion. Congress may not “directly command[] a State to 
regulate or indirectly coerce[] a State to adopt a federal regulatory 
system as its own.”311 To further these points, the Chief Justice described 
at some length the burdens that Medicaid withdrawal would impose on 
states, reasoning, therefore, that the withdrawal would amount to coercion. 
He then provided a shorter explanation as to why these burdens were 
unforeseen and therefore constitutionally valid. 
The relationship between the Chief Justice’s points—“contract” and 
“coercion”—is far from clear. If the only point of mentioning contract 
law is to point out that agreements between the federal and state 
governments must be voluntary, then the appeal to contract law is 
nominal. The law forbids coercing anyone, not just one’s contractual 
partners.312 And to be sure, the rest of the Chief Justice’s reasoning focused 
more on the consequences of coercion than on contract law issues.313 He 
explained the burdens withdrawal of funding would impose on states. 
The weight of the burden, he claimed, constituted coercion. This coercion, 
he explained at some length, “threaten[s] the political accountability key 
to our federal system.”314 And while states can sometimes be trusted to 
take care of themselves, sometimes they cannot; and in this case, Congress 
was holding “a gun to the head[s]” of the states.315 The consequences were 
“economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to 
acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”316 
The opinion goes on to inquire whether the States could have 
anticipated the expansion as part of the Medicaid contract.317 But this 
“contract” discussion is secondary to, and much shorter than, the discussion 
of coercion. It is made only in response to “the Government claim[] that 
the Medicaid expansion is properly viewed merely as a modification of 
the existing program because the States agreed that Congress could 
 
 309. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 
101 Geo. L.J. 861, 867–68 (2013) (explaining why the Chief Justice’s opinion is best described as the 
controlling one in this context). 
 310. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (internal citations omitted). 
 311. Id.  
 312. Id. at 2604–07. 
 313. Id. at 2604. 
 314. Id. at 2602. 
 315. Id. at 2604. 
 316. Id. at 2605. 
 317. Id. 
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change the terms of Medicaid when they signed on in the first place.”318 
The Court held that there were limits to this power because the States 
could not have anticipated this expansion.319 But it is unclear what the 
import of this argument is: based on the Court’s reasoning, states’ ability 
to anticipate the expansion was beside the point.320 Coercion, whether 
anticipated or not, is unconstitutional.321 
Scholarship has therefore focused on the coercion argument. As 
Glenn Cohen explains, there was no coercion because the federal 
government was never obliged to create the program in the first place. 
“[T]here is no normative or constitutional obligation for the federal 
government to create or fund a Medicaid programme ab initio,” and the 
federal government could have imposed these conditions in a new plan.322 
Thus, unlike the case of the highway robber who imposes unlawful 
conditions, the federal government is in the clear.323 Mitch Berman similarly 
argues that the Court’s reasoning is undertheorized and insufficiently 
distinguishes between improper coercion and compulsion.324 Samuel 
Bagenstos has similarly explored the constitutional contours of the 
coercion argument.325 Cohen’s assertion—that the coercion argument is 
both wrong and weak—is persuasive. 
By contrast, the contractual argument—which is a far stronger 
argument—has received less attention in its own right (rather than as a 
corollary of the coercion argument). At the outset, we must confront the 
question of whether we can think of this argument analogously to contract 
law at all. The Chief Justice is on solid precedential ground in noting that 
federal spending programs are conceived of as “much in the nature of a 
contract.”326 But Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor challenged this: “By 
including in the Act ‘a clause expressly reserving to it “[t]he right to alter, 
amend, or repeal any provision” of the Act,’ . . . Congress put States on 
notice that the Act ‘created no contractual rights.’”327 This argument, 
which is the only argument the dissent offered to undermine the contract-
like nature of the program, is not persuasive.328 Contracts frequently 
 
 318. Id.  
 319. Id. at 2606. 
 320. Id. at 2606–07. 
 321. See also id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that coercion is the ultimate point). 
 322. Glenn Cohen, Conscientious Objection, Coercion, the Affordable Care Act, and U.S. States, 
20 Ethical Persp. 163, 171–72 (2013). 
 323. Id.; Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in the 
Healthcare Cases, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2013). 
 324. Berman, supra note 308, provides a full exploration of the conception of coercion in this context. 
 325. Bagenstos, supra note 309, at 868–71. 
 326. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (internal citation omitted). 
 327. Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to 
Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986)). 
 328. Justice Ginsburg also noted that according to precedent, “‘[u]nlike normal contractual 
undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing 
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contain clauses granting to one party sole discretion to modify contract 
terms.329 The mere presence of an analogous term is not sufficient to 
render the program dissimilar to a contract.330 
Next, the dissent claimed that even if the program were contract-
like, there was no breach. The Medicaid statute “contains a clause 
expressly reserving ‘[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision’” 
to Congress.331 However, under traditional contract law principles (that 
is, apart from any unrelated constitutional limitations), this does not give 
Congress carte blanche to alter the program. Under standard contract 
law doctrines recognized in most states, such as the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, such provisions encompass only those eventualities 
that both parties would reasonably contemplate.332 Under this reading, 
then, even though the clause gave sole discretion to Congress, Congress 
was expected to act reasonably. This approach, admittedly, creates some 
ambiguity, but no more than has existed in contract doctrine in this area 
for many years. For example, it is unlikely that courts would countenance 
a bait and switch where Congress suddenly shifted the burden of funding 
to the states, or attempted to shirk federal commitments after states 
altered their infrastructure, and took other actions in reliance on the 
promises made in the program (that are not otherwise protected by other 
statutes or agreements). 
A better ground for the decision, then, would have more clearly 
analogized to contract doctrine, specifically the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.333 The decision to terminate the Medicaid program contract 
must be made in good faith; it cannot be used as a bargaining ploy to force 
 
the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.’” Id. at 2637 n.21 (quoting Bennett v. 
Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985)). But this is not terribly informative because it only 
informs us that there are some differences between Spending Clause legislation and contracts. It does 
not suggest that past cases have held that the distinction renders Spending legislation unlike a contract 
as a general matter—indeed, the precedent on which the controlling opinion relies on in suggesting 
that such legislation is “much in the nature of a contract” appears to foreclose that argument. 
 329. Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations on the Use of 
Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1099, 1101–06 (2010) (providing a recent comprehensive 
overview of these kinds of contracts). 
 330. I recognize that the implication of my argument is that this aspect of the reasoning of Bowen, 
477 U.S. 41, on which Justice Ginsburg relies, is incorrect. I believe that Bowen was undermined by 
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), (decided the following year) and its progeny, on which the 
Chief Justice relies. Ultimately, however, the precedent is ambiguous, and I believe one must analyze 
the argument on its own terms. 
 331. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2574 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012)). 
 332. Steve J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, Contractual Good Faith: Formation, Performance, 
Breach, Enforcement § 2.2.1, at 23–29 (1995). 
 333. Berman, supra note 308, at 1300, correctly argues that contract doctrine as presented by the Court 
does not support the majority’s putative coercion-based reasoning, and looks beyond contract law to explain 
the Court’s reasoning. However, my claim here is that other contract doctrines explain the reasoning 
independent of the coercion based argument. See generally Alces & Greenfield, supra note 329 (discussing 
the use of the doctrine in analogous contract contexts). 
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states into taking conditions that Congress could not otherwise force on 
them because of their unforeseeable nature. This approach does not require 
Congress to “provide clear notice of conditions it might later impose” at 
the outset of a program, as the dissent contends.334 Rather, it simply requires 
that later conditions imposed as a result of the provision giving the federal 
government discretion to change the program could have been reasonably 
in the contemplation of the parties when the program was first enacted.335 
The majority did not precisely adopt this approach. However, in 
responding to the government, it emphasized that states, as a factual matter, 
could not have contemplated the expansion when signing onto Medicaid: 
“A State could hardly anticipate that Congress[]” would endeavor to 
“transform [the Medicaid program] so dramatically.”336 The explanation is 
compelling: 
The original program was designed to cover medical services for four 
particular categories of the needy . . . . Previous amendments to Medicaid 
eligibility merely altered and expanded the boundaries of these categories. 
Under the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program 
to meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with 
 
 334. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2637 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Indeed, this foreseeability aspect of contract doctrine 
(combined with other doctrines, such as contracts void on grounds of illegality) can be used to explain 
Spending Clause jurisprudence more broadly, as laid out in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203. The 
elements of the doctrine suggest that one of the goals the Court hopes to achieve through this doctrine 
is (among other things) to ensure that when Congress alters the conditions of a program, the 
conditions remain within the contemplated scope of the contractual arrangement. Id. at 207–11. This 
justification of the factors applies only to situations where Congress may, ex post, alter the conditions 
of the contract, and not to situations where the conditions are laid out in advance. In such situations, 
the Dole factors cannot serve the predictability interest outlined here, as the conditions are already 
known. This Article remains agnostic as to whether they serve other values or no values at all. 
Dole requires that a condition be (a) unambiguous, (b) related to the federal interest in the 
program, (c) constitutional, and, (probably) (d) not unduly coercive. Id. at 213. But see Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (suggesting that this is not an element 
of the Dole test). Each of these serve the policy of ensuring that in complex programs, states are not 
blindsided when Congress imposes a new condition on existing programs. After all, states cannot 
clearly contemplate complying with a contractual arrangement whose terms are ambiguous, or whose 
terms range unpredictably beyond the subject matter of the contract. It is, after all, hard to clearly 
contemplate the meaning of a promise that is unclear. Nor could they imagine a condition that is 
unrelated to the program at hand: for example, if the Department of Health and Human Services 
(with Congressional authorization) adopted provisions commandeering state police forces, under a 
pure contract law approach (and independent of federalism concerns) such regulations would be 
invalid as the parties could not have contemplated that such conditions would accompany funding 
relating to health and human services. Additionally, a state could not contemplate complying with a 
condition that is unconstitutional or that is improperly coercive, under contract law principles against 
duress (for example, if Congress threatened to overthrow a state government for failure to accede to 
conditions) or void on grounds of public policy. I note that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
may be a free-standing bar, apart from the contract law analogy, to such conditions. Berman’s defense 
of an anti-coercion principle resembles the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see supra note 308; 
my use of the term “coercion” reflects traditional usage in contract law rather than in the Bermanian 
sense. 
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income below 133 percent of the poverty level. It is no longer a 
program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a 
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance 
coverage.337 
The subsequent discussion of the context of the Act’s passage is also 
persuasive. 
The dissent responded with two principal arguments, neither of 
which are compelling.338 First, it relies on the language reserving to the 
federal government the right to alter the contract, and the precedent 
interpreting that language, which I address above (although the 
controlling opinion largely ignores this point).339 Second, it points to “the 
enlargement of Medicaid in the years since 1965.”340 But as the 
controlling opinion points out, “the most dramatic alteration . . . does not 
come close to working the transformation the expansion accomplishes.”341 
The better argument in the dissent is that states could have 
anticipated a change of this kind precisely because of the context in 
which Medicaid was enacted. Medicaid was compromise legislation, 
enacted only after the failure of universal health care.342 States were 
aware of this. They should have also been aware that given shifting political 
coalitions, combined with the clause giving the federal government 
discretion to change conditions, the program could be universally (speaking 
comparatively at least) expanded. I therefore am, ultimately, unsympathetic 
to the controlling opinion’s conclusion; but contract law presents a far 
stronger argument than the coercion approach on which it seems to 
entirely rely. A contract approach, while ultimately incorrect, would not 
have been entirely unprecedented. Like courts have done for centuries, it 
would have reconstrued the parties’ intentions based on the language of 
their contracts and past dealings, looked to the behavior of the parties 
with respect to the current transaction and argued that Congress 
“recognized it was enlisting the States in a new health care program,” 
something the states could not have contemplated.343 
Foregrounding the contract law argument helps explain why we 
should be (as the Justices were) concerned about the burden rights 
revocation imposes, which they, incorrectly used to bolster a coercion 
 
 337. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 338. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). “In short, given § 1304, this Court’s construction 
of § 1304’s language in Bowen, and the enlargement of Medicaid in the years since 1965, a state would 
be hard put to complain that it lacked fair notice when, in 2010, Congress altered Medicaid to embrace 
a larger portion of the Nation’s poor.” Id. at 2639. 
 339. Id. at 2630. 
 340. Id. at 2639. 
 341. Id. at 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 342. Gunnar Almgren, Health Care Politics, Policy and Services: A Social Justice Analysis 
81, 85 (2d. ed. 2012). 
 343. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606. 
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argument. So far, my argument expounds contract law(-like) doctrines 
latent in the various opinions, and does not turn on the question of rights 
revocation. What is important is that there was (something like) a contract 
between two parties and there was a breach, or at least, a violation of a 
covenant analogous to that of good faith and fair dealing (which happened 
to involve revocation of funds). 
But we must not forget (as Justice Ginsburg noted in passing)344 that 
this was no usual contract, as the breaching party was the government. 
Historically, when there is a contract, and the breaching party is a state, 
the wrong was understood not just as a breach of a contract, but also a 
violation of a vested right.345 The modern vested rights doctrine is not 
capacious enough anymore to easily lend itself to this analysis as a formal 
matter. However, the reasoning of much of the controlling opinion’s and 
joint dissent’s “coercion” analyses is more coherently understood as 
analogous to a vested rights analysis in that it relies on the fact that the 
rights involved are deeply connected to the operation of state government. 
Part of the reason is the fact that these rights are contractual or pseudo-
contractual. Such rights are important for the reasons outlined in Subpart 
B. But the Chief Justice and the joint dissenters spilled a large amount of 
ink attempting to persuade readers of the importance of the Medicaid 
program to the states in other ways. The Medicaid program is constitutive 
of states—the program “accounts for over 20 percent of the average State’s 
total budget” and “the States have developed intricate statutory and 
administrative regimes over the course of many decades to implement 
their objectives.”346 Much as with the case with Goldberg, taking away 
resources this important would be untenable. As the joint dissent worried:  
A State forced out of the program . . . would almost certainly find it 
necessary to increase its own health-care expenditures substantially, 
requiring either a drastic reduction in funding for other programs or a 
large increase in state taxes. And these new taxes would come on top 
of the federal taxes already paid by the State’s citizens to fund the 
Medicaid program in other States.347 
Thus, the conclusion is even more dramatic than that in Goldberg. There, 
the threatened loss was “grievous.”348 Here, it is “a gun to the head.”349 
James Blumstein provocatively argues that the situation of the states is 
 
 344. See supra notes 328 and 330 (discussing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2637 n.21 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part), and Bowen). 
 345. This is clearest perhaps in the context of corporate charters. A violation of the charter the State 
granted was seen as the State trying to get out of a contract it made with a corporation to recognize it and 
permit it to do business or hold a monopoly. This was treated as a vested rights violation. See Thompson, 
supra note 23. 
 346. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 347. Id. at 2657 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
 348. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). 
 349. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J). 
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“analogous to the life-choice reliance regarding abortion.”350 Much like 
women who relied on the availability of abortion to order their “thinking 
and living,” so too did states rely on the availability of federal funding to 
order their business.351 
The contractual breach is, therefore, all the more troubling because 
it involves the separation of an entity from a constitutive set of benefits 
to which it is deeply connected. Foregrounding the contract argument 
then also helps explain the facts that so troubled the Justices, which they 
included in their “coercion” analysis, and connects the contract law and 
“coercion” arguments in a way that the various opinions fail to do. But 
one question remains—can we coherently talk about nonhuman “entities” 
as subject to a connectedness analysis?352 
On balance, I think the answer is yes, albeit not with the same degree 
of urgency and immediacy as a natural person. First, as a legal matter, 
corporations have long been recognized as having vested rights.353 Second, 
revoking an entity’s vested rights could harm individuals associated with 
the entity, if not the entity itself. Our understanding of an artificial entity, 
our allegiance to it, our relationship to it, often depend on certain rights it 
possesses. The revocation of certain rights that have ordered our 
interactions with the entity and the entity’s interactions with the world 
can affect real people affiliated with the entity—employees, customers, 
and, in the case of states, citizens. Thus, one could imagine that citizens 
of a state that suddenly stopped providing health benefits because of a 
loss of federal funding would be affected in ways apart from the damages 
caused by the loss of medical assistance. They could well reimagine their 
relationship with the State, perceive themselves as betrayed; the State 
itself could lose legitimacy in their eyes. While the entity itself, therefore, 
can feel no psychological blow, those who understand themselves in relation 
to the entity can be negatively affected when the entity ceases to be able 
to function in a way they feel is essential to the entity.354 
Third, and finally, certain kinds of negotiation take place between 
small groups of individuals, in the intergovernmental context, often part 
of small subdivisions or working groups in agencies that have close and 
 
 350. James F. Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable Care Act’s Mandated Medicaid Expansion: 
The Coercion Principle and the Clear Notice Rule, 2011–2012 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 67, 103 n.153. 
 351. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 352. See Cohen, supra note 322, at 181–82 (expressing doubt that a state can be personified and 
coerced); Markovits, supra note 246, at 1465 (doubting whether “it remains possible that contracts 
involving organizations might generate a morally valuable collaborative relation”). 
 353. See e.g. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 576 (1819); Thompson, 
supra note 23. 
 354. While I agree with Markovits that the contract does not bind agents and stakeholders on the same 
moral basis as if they were promisees or promisors themselves, the point I am making here is a 
psychological rather than moral one. This, to some extent, may deviate from Markovits’s view. See 
Markovits, supra note 246. 
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recurring professional relationships. These individuals can feel deeply 
connected to rights and benefits for which they have negotiated, and can 
take a breach personally as a betrayal and dignitary harm.355 This last 
category does not apply to negotiation with respect to the Affordable Care 
Act, among which many entities were involved at arms-length negotiation. 
The connectedness/vestedness argument does not completely turn 
on the contract law argument. Certainly, if there were a breach, vested 
rights would have been, under black letter law, revoked. But even 
without contractual or pseudo-contractual violations, the States could 
have developed other, property-like interests in holding on to the funding, 
much like the recipients in Goldberg. However, because ultimately there 
was no contractual breach and the entities involved were artificial rather 
than natural persons, the States’ case became weaker. The decisive 
factor, however, distinguishing this case from Goldberg, is the fact that 
the States sought to limit their constituents’ access to more of the same 
right. If state officials truly valued the State’s role as a benefits provider, 
and valued the recognition of its citizens as such, they would have 
welcomed Medicaid expansion. Rejection of Medicaid expansion belies 
the claim that Medicaid funding is central to the State’s identity for these 
officials. I therefore conclude, tentatively, that there was no violation 
under the connectedness principle. But this vestedness approach makes 
the majority’s argument stronger and more coherently links coercion to 
the contractual concerns that underlay its argument. 
III.  Rhetoric and Rights, Revocation, and Restoration 
One criticism of the inflation effect judges apply to rights 
revocation—at least in the due process context—is that it exerts a 
powerful status quo bias on behalf of those who have certain rights, and 
disfavors minorities who lack these rights. But such ossification has been 
avoided largely through the dialectic flexibility and ambiguity in the 
notions of “rights,” or of restoration versus revocation, ambiguities that I 
have so far avoided in order to focus on the power the idea of rights 
revocation possesses. But rights claims themselves, and the notion of 
rights deprivation, are constructed. To understand a right as having been 
revoked, we take for granted extraneous understandings of the baselines, 
of what the interest it is that the State provided in the first place. 
Depending on whether we understand this interest as a right or not, we 
will consider the failure to respect an interest a revocation, or perhaps, as 
a restoration of a previously existing status quo. Because of the rhetorical 
power of rights revocation, opposite sides present their interests as rights, 
and a failure to respect those interests as revocation. When institutions 
partake in these struggles, their own legitimacy is put on the line. Thus, 
 
 355. Id. at 1465 (discussing small organizations). 
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the battles over revocation and restoration are more than questions of 
fact; rather they are questions over framing, legitimacy, and the role of 
the State. In so doing, courts (and other actors) construct the “victims” of 
the revocation, the entities claiming rights and their revocation, as well as 
the “perpetrators,” the entities that allegedly revoke the rights. 
Understanding how these claims play out is important in order to 
work out the role rights revocation analysis plays—the analysis is not 
some product of the burden imposed by a clear revocation of right. 
Rather, it helps construct the right itself, and whether the failure to 
respect the interest was a revocation. Subpart A explains the long deferred 
question of how we can even properly conceive of rights violations as 
rights revocations, and relies on a distinction of rights as constructed 
versus rights as capabilities. Subpart B expands on this understanding 
that rights are constructed: various constituencies claim that certain 
interests are rights. Hence both sides in a case may claim that there is a 
right involved. Plaintiffs claim that the challenged action has taken away 
the right. Defendants claim that the challenged action did no more than 
restore a right which was previously taken away. Subpart C concludes by 
explaining how the legitimacy of government institutions themselves is 
implicated in this process. 
A. Conceptualizing Rights Revocation 
Sometimes the State literally takes away a right, as I shall explain, in 
the case of Proposition 8. But sometimes, one may argue, what the State 
does is “violate” rather than literally take away a right. Throughout this 
Article, I, like many others, have casually referred to this behavior as 
rights revocation. As I explain, the different ways in which we conceptualize 
rights helps make sense of thinking of rights violations also as revocations. 
Let us first consider the easiest case of rights revocation. Most 
lawyers would take a formal approach to defining rights: when a litigant 
goes into court and claims a right against the State, as a formal matter 
she is describing a certain legal relationship between herself and the 
State. The State has failed to respect that legal relationship, and the 
plaintiff seeks judicial remedy. 
The State may alter the legal relationship between the plaintiff and 
itself, if it has the power to do so, to obliterate the plaintiff’s claim. In 
such a situation, the taking away metaphor makes sense—the plaintiff no 
longer possesses the ability she once did to lay a claim against the State. 
One example is the case of Proposition 8. According to the California 
Supreme Court, at least, the state constitution as originally enacted by 
the citizens of the state, required that the State permit same-sex couples 
access to marriage at the same level as different-sex couples.356 Opponents, 
 
 356. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63 (Cal. 2009). 
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of course, suggested that the court created the right, as I shall discuss 
more later. The State altered this relationship—the constitution was 
amended, and the right to marry was taken away from same-sex couples. 
These couples could no longer make this claim of the State (under 
California law, at least). These dynamics need not always occur at the 
constitutional level or involve citizens versus the State. If the legislature 
grants a benefit to an entity—for example, tort immunity in certain 
circumstances—and then takes it away, the legislature has altered the 
relationship and taken away a benefit that the entity previously enjoyed. 
In both examples, the “right” has been stripped by the same power that 
granted it. 
Consider a situation, however, in which rights are not taken away by 
the same entity that grants them. There are no difficulties when the 
agency that takes away the right is superior in power to the agency that 
grants them—for example, Congress taking away a right granted by an 
agency, or the Constitution taking away a right granted by congressional 
or state statute. But when the agency that refuses to recognize a right is 
of lesser power, a problem arises with respect to the taking away 
metaphor when an abstract right is involved. 
To speak of a state literally taking away rights granted by the 
Constitution appears to be an absurdity. If rights are abstract legal 
relationships between entities, permitting individuals to make certain 
claims once the Constitution defines what these relationships are, the 
State cannot alter them. The State may ignore this de jure relationship 
and may fail to respect it, thereby violating its terms. However it cannot 
alter this legal relationship, much less obliterate it. We therefore talk 
about the State as violating the right. Some may understand a right of a 
citizen against the State as a term of the social contract between the 
citizen and the State. But by breaching a term of the contract, a 
contracting party does not “take away” the contractual term—she simply 
violates it. 
If the “taking away” of rights by inferior powers were simply 
infrequent metaphors in obscure law review articles, it would be an issue 
of no concern; legal scholars sometimes make indifferent poets. But we 
often talk about violations of rights as revocations of rights. The 
Constitution itself imagines rights revocation in this way. For example, 
the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall “deprive” 
citizens of liberties “without due process of law.”357 The provision 
imagines that states may deprive—that is, take away—constitutionally 
guaranteed rights with due process. Even more puzzlingly, courts and 
individuals regularly imagine a world in which rights can be taken away, 
yet through some sleight of hand, retained. Thus in Bray v. Alexandria 
 
 357. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Women’s Health Clinic, Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that women 
have been “deprive[d] . . . of their constitutional right to choose an abortion 
. . . by [those] blockading clinics with the intended effect of preventing 
women from exercising a right . . . they possess.”358 This observation 
makes intuitive sense, but when further investigated, it seems problematic: 
how could women “possess” and be “deprive[d]” of a right at the same 
time? Yet litigants regularly state in one breath that they have rights, but 
at the same time, that the right was taken away. Unlike the proverbial 
cake, the State may devour your rights but leave them in your possession. 
To answer this riddle, consider two alternate conceptions of rights.359 
One is the prescriptive understanding of rights-as-legal-claims. It describes 
what plaintiffs believe to be the ideal relationship and set of obligations 
and dues between themselves and the state (or the defendant). Another 
conception of rights, however, is a descriptive understanding of rights as 
capabilities. Rather than ideals, this understanding concerns pragmatic 
facts on the ground. To the extent a person can perform the activity 
without hindrance, she has a right to engage in the activity; to the extent 
she cannot, she lacks the right. Under this conception, we do not engage 
with moral or ethical questions as to the ideal relationship between the 
person and someone else.   
To explain the distinction, consider a simple example: To say that a 
woman has the right to have an abortion has different meanings under 
the prescriptive and descriptive frameworks. Under the prescriptive 
framework, we are describing the proper ideal or moral behavior under 
the law of the state (and perhaps others) with respect to a woman. But 
under a descriptive account, a woman only has a right to an abortion if 
she has the money to go to a clinic where there are doctors who may 
perform the abortion. On this account, it does not matter whether she is 
owed non-interference or assistance as a moral matter or not—it only 
matters that she can, in fact, obtain the abortion should she wish to.360  
Gaining a prescriptive right often entails making arguments to 
various groups, including courts, to recognize the right. The state can 
only deprive the individual of the right as a prescriptive matter by 
altering the state constitution or other moral or legal norms. Obtaining 
the right as a descriptive matter involves ensuring access to various other 
 
 358. 506 U.S. 263, 343 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 359. I base my exposition on the work of Martha Nussbaum. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 273, 293 (1997). 
 360. To the extent that our actual behavior is guided by our ideals, it may be important for us to 
secure prescriptive access to the right in order to secure the right as a descriptive matter: it may be 
harder to have access to something in actual fact (descriptive right), if no one recognizes our moral 
entitlement to it (prescriptive right). As Nussbaum puts it, a prescriptive “right . . . would be prior to a 
capability [that is, a descriptive right], and a ground for the securing of a capability.” Id. 
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resources. The state (or someone else) can deprive the individual of the 
right as a descriptive matter by taking away any necessary resource.   
When a person goes to court then, and says that she possesses a 
right that the state has taken away, she is using the term right in two 
different senses. She is saying that as a legal or moral matter, she has a 
right—a prescriptive right. However, as a descriptive matter, she is 
claiming the state took away her ability to engage in the activity—a 
descriptive right—either through ultra vires action or having in place 
statutes or policies that limited her actual access to the right in some way. 
To be sure, the line between state action and inaction, revocation, and 
restoration remains elusive and constructed.361 This explains Justice 
Stevens’s dissent—women “possess” the prescriptive right to have an 
abortion without interference (in that case, by a private party under a 
statute), but their actual capability of doing so is compromised. 
There also remains the question of what level of interference—what 
burden—constitutes “taking away” a right.362 For example, one may 
claim that only forcible prevention from engaging in the right (by refusal 
to provide resources, or ex ante detention) constitutes a deprivation. 
Alternatively, ex post sanctions for engaging in the right may also 
constitute deprivation. These ex post sanctions may range from drastic 
criminal penalties to unofficial harassment. Regulatory takings, in 
particular, raise similar questions as to how “heavy” a burden must be to 
constitute a deprivation on a regular basis.363 One may differ on whether 
there is a line between taking rights away and merely burdening the 
right, and if there is one, where that line should be drawn. I set this 
question aside as the exact point on which a burden becomes a 
deprivation of a right is one that must be analyzed in specific contexts. 
B. Constructing Rights and Revocation 
Understanding rights as prescriptive, however, means that groups on 
both sides of a case can (and do) claim that a failure to respect their 
interests would “take away” their “rights.” Understanding how these claims 
play out is important in order to work out the role rights revocation analysis 
plays—the analysis is not some product of the burden imposed by a clear 
 
 361. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. 
Q. 470 (1923); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 85. 
 362. This is related to what is a “necessary” condition for an individual to exercise a right. See, e.g., 
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 554 (2003), which found there was a right to same-sex intimate conduct, 
from a case involving adoption by gay individuals by explaining that “[t]he relevant state action is not 
criminal prohibition [as involved in Lawrence], but grant of a statutory privilege [that is, adoption]”). 
 363. Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One Distinction Too Many, 64 Stan. L. 
Rev. Online 99 (2012) presents a recent statement. 
K - Konnoth_18 (ONLINE) (Do Not Delete) 6/22/2015 9:49 PM 
1432 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1365 
revocation of right. Rather, it helps construct the right itself, and determines 
whether the failure to respect the interest was a revocation. 
1. Constructing Rights 
Not all interests can be understood as legal rights. To turn back to 
Fuller’s (or indeed, Bracton’s) discussion as an example, individuals 
understand only those agreements that are accompanied with formalities 
as embodying legal rights.364 Formalities serve the purpose of giving an 
individual the understanding that the consequences of her action hold 
legal significance. The party to the contract understands, not just that a 
right can be asserted against her (which results, as Fuller notes, in 
deliberation), but also that she holds a right over another that possesses 
legal legitimacy. By contrast, as Bracton and Fuller would tell us, a 
promise made without formalities that cannot be enforced would not be 
a right. I claim that an individual feels more invested, or connected, to a 
right, once it has become understood as a legal right, and it has vested. 
But contractual rights are just one set of interests that are 
understood as rights in our legal system. Other forces also shape claims 
as legal rights claims—and just as individuals feel a greater sense of 
connectedness to contractual rights in part because of their legal 
significance, understood through formalistic rights frames, individuals in 
other contexts feel a greater sense of connectedness to claims they 
understand as constituting legal rights. 
My previous work documenting how the gay rights movement began 
to frame its interests in relationship recognition as a legal right to 
marriage in the 1970s provides a particular example of the difference 
between a mere interest and a right.365 The fight to end discrimination 
based on sexual orientation travelled some distance before its leaders 
understood their arguments through legal lenses, and their claims as 
“rights.” Leaders of the movement in the 1950s and 1960s utilized medical 
frames seeking to persuade society (including other gay individuals) that 
sexual orientation was a benign variation that did not deserve persecution. 
In the 1970s, however, gays developed a “legal, rights-seeking frame[],” 
by analogizing their claims to those of the civil rights movement, and 
positioning themselves as another minority group.366 
Relationship recognition, in particular, travelled the distance from 
becoming an interest of the movement, to that of a legal right, to finally, 
a vested right in some contexts. After initially, apparently, rejecting the 
notion of marriage recognition in the early 1950s, the nascent homophile 
 
 364. See supra notes 242–44. 
 365. See Craig Konnoth, Note, Created in its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity, and Gay 
Litigation in the 1950s–1970s, 119 Yale L.J. 316 (2009). 
 366. Id. at 328. 
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movement of the early 1960s began to articulate an interest in relationship 
recognition, to make easier the logistics of insurance, taxes, and child 
rearing. However, “demands remained limited and untranslatable into 
the language of a civil rights movement.”367 Gay activists knew they wanted 
relationship recognition, but did not consider it to be a civil right. 
Mobilization was discussed, but never really found purchase. It was only 
in the 1970s that historical developments allowed gay activists to think of 
the possibility that relationship recognition was a civil right of which they 
were being deprived. This ensured that cases were filed, and articles 
written. The indignation of rights deprivation resulted in marriage being 
claimed as a right and provoked related litigation. 
Robert Post and Reva Siegel show the dialogic nature of rights 
discourse in general, as groups engage with outsiders to persuade them of 
that which group members already believe—that the interest they possess 
holds the power of being a “right.”368 Thus, when referring to a certain 
claim as a “right,” litigants perform a performative, jurisgenerative,369 
political act, claiming an interest as an artifact of the constitutional 
universe.370 They are conscious that this claim will be judged by courts 
and by the public, opponents will respond to it. Accordingly, they will 
engage in campaigns to frame the right as a right both within their own 
community and outside the community. Their claim that a certain option 
is a right is subject to numerous constraints. That rhetoric of rights 
establishes a felt connection between litigants or activists and the claim 
along with the concomitant sense of connection and loss when one feels 
that a right has been taken away. 
Because interests are converted into rights through narrative, 
distributive notions of ownership birth the sense of connectedness to the 
right. It is those rights we describe as basic capabilities, primary goods or 
fundamental rights of Part I.C that we feel the deepest connections to—
but to categorize those rights as such we need a theory of distribution, be it 
based on specific kinds of morality, as I explain above, utilitarianism, or 
something else. But here is where our understandings of ownership 
merge—we feel connected to an object because we believe we should 
possess it based on a distributive system of justice, which may in turn 
allot us the object because of the connection we feel to it. 
 
 367. Id. at 359. 
 368. See generally, Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373 (2007). 
 369. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983). 
 370. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 868 (2002). 
K - Konnoth_18 (ONLINE) (Do Not Delete) 6/22/2015 9:49 PM 
1434 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1365 
2. Competing Rights 
As a conceptual matter, understanding what the right is requires an 
understanding of, as Sunstein puts it, the “constitutional baseline.”371 Is 
the correct baseline from which we measure state action a regime where 
no welfare benefits are provided, such that anything that goes over that 
baseline is something more, a non-right, which can be taken away without 
impunity? Or is the baseline the provision of benefits, such that the 
failure to provide the benefit is the revocation of a right? Extraneous 
normative arguments shape these claims. 
Accordingly, and unsurprisingly, claims are often articulated as 
competing rights. In many cases, both sides may claim that they have 
“rights,” of which they are being deprived. The quintessential example is 
that of opposing private parties (tabling the question of whether states 
can claim that their interests may also count as rights). Here, I am not 
only talking about competing contractual claims, but also constitutional 
cases. For example, as Herbert Wechsler famously observed many years 
ago, Brown v. Board of Education372 limited the rights of white parents to 
ensure that their children did not associate with black children—which 
may have been inimical to important identity interests these parents 
held.373 Reva Siegel describes the powerful role this argument played in 
the reaction in southern courts, legislatures, and other institutions that 
sought to limit the reach of Brown.374 The State may even extend these 
prohibitions to other contexts, such as employment (though, of course, 
prohibiting private discrimination is not constitutionally required).375 
In these cases, although a state qua state has no cognizable 
interest,376 surely the individuals that are forced to participate in the 
state-sponsored activity may claim a vested right, or experience an 
endowment effect in the right of (non-)association (or of discrimination) 
they are forced to give up which may be important to their personhood. 
If courts considered a vested interest or the endowment effect in, for 
example, associational interests in their analysis under the Due Process 
Clause, the interests of discriminators could win the day. The rights 
reversal analysis would significantly harm the rights of minorities. 
 
 371. It does so precisely because it embodies a controversial substantive baseline. Cass R. Sunstein, 
Neutrality in Constitutional Law (Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1, 43 (1992); see Sunstein, supra note 13, at 45.  
 372. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 373. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1959). 
 374. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional 
Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1487–89 (2004). 
 375. But is currently prohibited by statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2015). 
 376. This resembles the point I make in Part II.C.2 that stakeholders in corporate entities are 
affected when the entity loses certain abilities, in this case, the ability of the State to discriminate. 
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At the doctrinal level, however, courts will not recognize a “vested 
right to do wrong”377—such as an interest in discrimination. Thus, in a 
case like Brown, a Court would answer that the interest of discriminators 
cannot be considered when bare animus animates the interest.378 The 
Court first determines whether there is a legitimate, non-animus based 
interest present before it considers whether the right is taken away. 
But the extra-constitutional forces that “construct” rights, to which 
Post, Siegel, and I, among others have pointed, ultimately influences this. 
A bare animus interest can shade into an interest in association,379 as 
Wechsler pointed out, (or indeed, as we can imagine, into freedom of 
religion,380 speech,381 and so on). The Court must make (and has made) 
value judgments as to where this line lies based upon claims, analogies, 
and frames employed by litigants. Thus, when an individual claims the 
right of nonassociation with blacks, a court would have to first determine 
whether the First Amendment’s right of association covers the interest. 
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,382 in which the Boy Scouts violated a 
state antidiscrimination law by expelling a gay scoutmaster, and other 
cases,383 the Court has concluded that the right of freedom of association 
protects certain discriminatory acts that exclude LGB individuals. Thus, 
the rights-revoking analysis would require a court to consider the 
endowment effect the Boy Scouts felt when losing the right to exclude 
LGBT individuals under state antidiscrimination law. In Brown, the 
rights at stake were not legitimate interests in association. Thus, the 
Court could not consider the discriminatory interests of certain white 
parents, nor the endowment effect attaching to those interests. The 
different framings of the rights at stake in Brown and Dale yielded different 
outcomes. 
3. Constructing Revocation 
Our definition of what a right is, ultimately, affects whether we 
conceptualize a government action as revoking or restoring rights. 
Because rights revocation rhetoric has visceral, and often doctrinal, 
power, cases often see a battle over whether the state action took a right 
away, or merely restored a preexisting right that was unfairly taken away. 
Let us return again to Proposition 8. Did the opponents take away a right 
 
 377. See, e.g., Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. 160, 175 (1864) (internal citation omitted). 
 378. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
 379. Wechsler, supra note 373. 
 380. Cf. Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a prohibition on 
wearing an anti-abortion button featuring a fetus in employment does not constitute religious discrimination 
violating Title VII). 
 381. Cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that laws against hate speech violate the 
First Amendment). 
 382. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 383. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
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or restore the status quo? As I note above, the California Supreme Court 
suggested that the right to marry always existed in the California 
Constitution. Proponents of Proposition 8 disagreed; for them, marriage 
had traditionally been between members of different sexes. Thus, in 
reviewing the effects of Proposition 8, in a notable passage, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that “[p]roponents resist . . . framing . . . the question” as 
taking rights away.384 “In re Marriage Cases was a ‘short-lived decision,’ 
and same-sex couples were allowed to marry only during a ‘143-day 
hiatus’ between the effective date of the Marriage Cases decision and the 
enactment of Proposition 8.”385 Thus, proponents argued, Proposition 8 
took no rights away, rather it was “a decision to ‘restore’ the ‘traditional 
definition of marriage’” that the California Supreme Court had taken 
away.386 Similarly, in their briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court, proponents 
argued that Proposition 8 took nothing away; it merely gave back what 
was already there.387 
Proposition 8 was challenged on various federal constitutional 
grounds. The Ninth Circuit held specifically that revoking already existing 
marriage rights violated equal protection guarantees. Allowing proponents 
to successfully argue that the interests that same-sex couples had before 
Proposition 8 could not be called “rights” would have been fatal to the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision. The court would not have been able to hold that 
Proposition 8 revoked rights, which, in turn, would have depleted the 
force of its argument. The court therefore made short shrift of this 
argument. The court claimed to be 
bound . . . by the California Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretation 
of Proposition 8’s effect on California law . . . Proposition 8 
“eliminat[ed] . . . the right of same-sex couples to equal access to the 
designation of marriage” by “carv[ing] out a narrow and limited 
exception to these state constitutional rights” that had previously 
guaranteed the designation of “marriage” to all couples, opposite-sex 
and same-sex alike.388  
This was therefore a case of rights revocation. 
Contrast Perry with the important state action case, American 
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan.389 There, workers 
complained that the State had facilitated insurance companies’ ability to 
withhold payment for medical benefits by repealing an earlier law that 
 
 384. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated on jurisdictional grounds by 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). 
 385. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 386. Id. 
 387. Brief for Petitioner at 27–36, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No.12-144). 
 388. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1079 (alteration in original) (quoting Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 61, 76 
(Cal. 2009)). 
 389. 526 U.S. 40 (1999). 
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prohibited such withholding.390 This, the workers claimed, was 
unconstitutional.391 The Court rejected the claim, holding that rather than 
taking away the right of workers not to have payments withheld,392 the 
repeal of the law simply restored the preexisting rights of insurance 
companies to withhold payments that earlier amendments took away. 
“The 1993 amendments, in effect, restored to insurers the narrow option, 
historically exercised by employers and insurers before the adoption of 
Pennsylvania’s workers’ compensation law, to defer payment of a bill 
until it is substantiated.”393 
The contrast between Perry and Sullivan is clear. Where the State 
takes away a right—as in Sullivan—it imposes a burden on those (there, the 
insurance companies) whose rights were withdrawn. It may therefore 
restore their rights. Indeed, in Sullivan, the Court held that not only was 
the State entitled to restore the rights, but also that such restoration did 
not even count as state action because it simply recreated a status quo 
that had been impermissibly altered. Thus, by successfully claiming the 
mantle of rights restoration, insurance companies erased the very agency 
of the State. In Perry, proponents claimed—and were denied—the same 
mantle of rights restoration. Being denied the mantle of rights restoration 
had important consequences: the change they effectuated was characterized 
as revocation rather than restoration, and therefore, treated as illegitimate. 
Multiple criteria can affect the framing as to whether revocation rather 
than restoration of rights, or some other innocuous change, has occurred.394 
Clearly, the revocation-restoration frame and the rights-non-rights 
frames cannot be considered independent of each other. Determining 
when a particular behavior is a right or an entitlement often determines 
whether a court can frame its loss as a revocation or a restoration. To 
return to Sullivan, part of the Court’s move was to characterize the right 
involved not as the workers’ right not to have insurance payments 
withheld.395 Rather, the right was that of the insurance companies to 
withhold payments.396 Depending on who could lay claim to the language 
of rights, the revocation versus restoration analysis would have come out 
differently. Thus, the rhetoric of revocation-versus-restoration is, at the 
 
 390. Id. at 47–48. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. at 53–54. (“Before the 1993 amendments, Pennsylvania restricted the ability of an insurer 
(after liability had been established, of course) to defer workers’ compensation medical benefits, including 
payment for unreasonable and unnecessary treatment, beyond 30 days of receipt of the bill.”).  
 393. Id. 
 394. This is where I depart most sharply from Sunstein. See Sunstein, supra note 13. Sunstein 
decries the status quo bias that institutions exhibit. I agree that in many cases, such a bias can create 
problems. However, Sunstein ignores the fact that our very notion of the status quo is constructed in 
many circumstances. 
 395. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 53. 
 396. Id. 
K - Konnoth_18 (ONLINE) (Do Not Delete) 6/22/2015 9:49 PM 
1438 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1365 
same time, an important battleground that frames and is framed by rights 
discourse itself. 
To return to Evans v. Utah, briefly, the State attempts a similar 
move that illustrates how the scope of the right affects whether the state 
action constitutes impermissible revocation. In its reply brief, the State’s 
second argument was that it did not seek to “revoke[]” “marriage 
licenses.”397 Rather, it would no longer recognize marriages of same-sex 
couples that married in Utah going forward. Thus, it was not taking away 
a right; rather, because it combined the scope of the right, its action was 
about prospective application. Of course, this premise can only be 
accepted if one sees the marriage right as an empty formality, rather than 
consisting of the bundle of rights and obligations that become vested 
with the ritual. At best, Utah’s move here looks a lot like a regulatory 
taking: individuals can hold on to the property, but all value has been 
divested from the property. Unsurprisingly, this argument did not prove 
successful—having conceded that the lower court injunction created a 
marriage right, Utah was limited in its ability to cabin the scope of the 
right. 
C. Institutional Conflict and Legitimacy Claims—Describing the 
Perpetrators 
So far, this Article has concentrated on the rhetoric of revocation in 
cases used by courts and activists to explain themselves. The rhetoric is 
used to help explain why the winners in the cases won and why the losers 
lost. However, the players in the game are not only the litigants. Courts 
and their legitimacy are very much in the mix. Through their decisions, 
courts paint themselves as the restorer of rights taken away by other 
governmental actors. In this way, they attempt to ensure their stature and 
legitimacy in the constitutional world. But other constitutional actors, 
including legislatures and executives, also attempt to make similar 
claims. This becomes apparent in the tussle between the Proposition 8 
proponents and the California Supreme Court on the issue of revocation 
and restoration. 
In Perry, the Ninth Circuit claimed, based on the California 
Supreme Court’s characterization in Strauss v. Horton, that the California 
Constitution always mandated marriage equality, which Proposition 8 
“eliminated” and “repealed.”398 But Strauss’s characterization of 
Proposition 8 as revoking a right, rather than merely reinstating the 
status quo, is puzzling at first. Strauss was concerned with whether 
Proposition 8 was so broad that it constituted an impermissible revision 
 
 397. Reply in Support of Emergency Application to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal at 4, 
Herbert v. Evans, No. 14A65 (July 18, 2014).  
 398. Perry v. Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 61 (Cal. 2009). 
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to the California Constitution rather than just an amendment.399 It held 
that Proposition 8 was a sufficiently minor change to the California 
Constitution that it constituted an amendment rather than a revision of 
the constitution.400 Had Strauss held that the change merely reinstated a 
previously existing definition—just as the Supreme Court did in Sullivan 
by claiming that the legislature only reinstated a previously existing 
right—it may have bolstered its argument that the Proposition was nothing 
but an amendment by minimizing the extent of the change. 
It is not as if the court lacked material to rely upon. Indeed, the 
Proposition 8 ballot material (on which the court partially relied)401 
would have allowed the court to do so. The first and longest capitalized 
phrase in the Proposition 8 ballot guide stated that Proposition 8 would 
“RESTORE THE DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE as a man and a 
woman.”402 Next, in listing the purpose of the measure, the first purpose 
was that it “restores the definition of marriage to what the vast majority of 
California voters already approved and human history has understood 
marriage to be.”403 
The court’s failure to rely on this language is best explained by the 
attack on the court in the ballot measure itself. In explaining why 
restoration was necessary, the ballot statement stated that “four activist 
judges in San Francisco wrongly overturned the people’s vote[.] [W]e 
need to pass this measure as a constitutional amendment to RESTORE 
THE DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE . . .”404 In other words, the ballot 
initiative attempted to paint the court as the actor that took away the 
right of parents to determine what their children are “taught in public 
schools.”405 This point is belabored. The measure would “overturn[] the 
outrageous decision of four activist Supreme Court judges who ignored 
the will of the people.”406 Similarly, the plaintiff-petitioners noted in their 
brief to the Supreme Court that this right existed for a mere “142 days of 
California’s 162-year history.”407 Thus, in claiming that it was restoring 
rights, the ballot attacked the legitimacy of the court. 
Even as it upheld the validity of Proposition 8, the court sought to 
reclaim its own legitimacy. It held that its prior decision did not take 
away a preexisting right to define marriage as between two heterosexual 
 
 399. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 386–87. 
 400. Id. at 445. 
 401. Id. at 472. 
 402. Proposition 8: Argument in Favor and Rebuttal, California Ballot Pamphlet: General 
Election Nov. 2, 2008, at 56–57, available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/argu-
rebut/argu-rebutt8.htm. 
 403. Id. at 56 (emphasis in original). 
 404. Id.  
 405. Id.  
 406. Id.  
 407. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 387, at 25 (emphasis in original).  
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individuals. Rather, it declared the state of the law at the time. 
Accordingly, it was Proposition 8 that took something away—the 
initiative measure did not “declare the state of the law as it existed” 
under the California Constitution at the time of the Marriage Cases, “but 
instead established a new substantive state constitutional rule.”408 Thus, 
the court’s response was to preserve its own legitimacy, claiming that all 
it did was what a court should do, as set out in the famous maxim of 
Marbury v. Madison—“declar[ing] what the law is.”409 In turn, the Ninth 
Circuit seized on this self-legitimizing rhetoric to paint proponents as 
right revokers, and therefore as illegitimate. This rhetoric defines the 
relationship, not just on a micro-scale between the California Supreme 
Court and the proponents of Proposition 8, but also on a macro-scale 
between courts and other government actors in general. Litigants and the 
courts who side with them paint other actors as depriving these litigants 
of preexisting rights to bolster their own legitimacy. 
That is not to say that other branches of government take these 
claims lying down. Like the proponents in Proposition 8, Congress has 
responded with bills seeking to “restore” judicial revocation of rights.410 
Consider, for example, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”).411 In Employment Division v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that enforcement of a neutral and generally applicable regulation 
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the federal Constitution 
even if it incidentally burdens the religious exercise of an individual or 
group.412 This departed from the more stringent Sherbert v. Verner 
standard, under which any law that established a substantial burden on 
religion required compelling justification.413 In response, Congress enacted 
RFRA, establishing strict scrutiny as a federal statutory standard for 
justifying enforcement of a general law where it imposes a substantial 
burden on religious exercise. RFRA squarely focuses on revocation and 
restoration: the Court was not merely in error, but “the Supreme Court 
virtually eliminated”414 the previous First Amendment test; the primary 
purpose of RFRA (listed first) was not just to correct the Court, but to 
“restore” the previous definition.415 The House Report uses similar 
rhetoric.416 
 
 408. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 115 (Cal. 2009).  
 409. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 410.  See Ryan Eric Emenaker, Constitutional Interpretation and Congressional Overrides: Changing 
Trends in Court-Congress Relations 15 n.36 (Feb. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243912. 
 411. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2015). 
 412. 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990). 
 413. 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 (1963). 
 414. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4). 
 415. Id. 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1). 
 416. H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 6 (1993). 
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But courts are jealous of their position as the ultimate arbiters of the 
Constitution, and therefore, as the determiners of when a constitutional 
right is taken away. The Supreme Court revealed as much in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, which struck down elements of RFRA as incompatible 
with the idea that only the court can determine what the substance of a 
constitutional right is.417 On Boerne’s account, Smith’s test did nothing to 
revoke rights and change the status quo. While the Court admitted (as it 
had to) that Smith did not apply the traditional test, it claimed that the 
decision nonetheless comported with free exercise jurisprudence as it 
had always been understood418—the court therefore, took nothing away. 
This shows a broader pattern in the battle between courts and 
legislatures. Courts claim to be above political manipulations of the 
rights discourses I have so far described; rights are constant and fixed 
and announced by them as appropriate. Engaging in the rhetoric and 
restoration endangers this picture. Legislative legitimacy, however, relies 
on being responsive and political. Legislatures can maximize their own 
legitimacy by painting other entities as political so that they can claim 
legislatures as great rights restorers. Thus, they have more to gain by 
claiming that constitutional rights are subject to alteration and revision, 
that courts can and do take them away, and that legislatures can restore 
them.  
Ultimately, the institutions that may be involved in these battles are 
varied. In the LGBT context alone, reversals involve multiple players, 
including legislative bodies. Relationship recognition among same-sex 
couples began—and ended almost immediately—in San Francisco in 
1989, where the Board of Supervisors passed a domestic partnership 
ordinance that was soon repealed by initiative.419 A same-sex-marriage 
law in Maine was repealed by initiative more recently.420 Maine voters 
reenacted the repealed law in 2012.421 In 1977, Anita Bryant and the Save 
our Children Campaign succeeded in their effort to repeal Miami-Dade 
County’s antidiscrimination ordinance.422 In Romer v. Evans, where 
Colorado repealed municipal ordinances by amending the state 
constitution, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of gay rights under the 
 
 417. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997).  
 418. Id. at 513–14. 
 419. Katherine Bishop, San Francisco Grants Recognition to Couples Who Aren’t Married, N.Y. 
Times, May 31, 1989, at A17. 
 420. John Curran, Main Gay Marriage Vote: Voters Repeal Law Legalizing Gay Marriage, 
Huffington Post (Mar. 18, 2010 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/03/maine-gay-
marriage-vote-e_n_344688.html.  
 421. David Sharp, Maine’s Same-Sex Marriage Law Goes Into Effect, Huffington Post (Dec. 29, 2012, 
9:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/29/maines-same-sex-marriage-_n_2380334.html.   
 422. Joanne Mariner, Anita Bryant’s Anti-Gay Legacy, Alternet (Feb. 2, 2004), http://www.alternet.org/ 
story/17737/anita_bryant%27s_anti-gay_legacy.  
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Equal Protection Clause for the first time.423 In each of these states, 
individuals were accorded rights only to watch as the law snatched them 
away. In such cases, the rhetoric may be somewhat different from that in 
this context. 
Conclusion 
From revocation we come full circle to restoration. Much of the 
political debate in this country is nostalgic, seeking to restore an allegedly 
idyllic age. But implicit in this notion of restoration is that of 
revocation—that age was taken away. Political actors blame various 
groups or institutional entities for this, and vice versa. These entities 
portray themselves as, and sincerely believe themselves to be, preserving 
important interests. 
But these interests in granted rights exist. Psychological, philosophical 
theorizing, our very understanding that we are and who we are, depend 
in part on the rights that we own at a given point in time. At the same 
time, our self-understanding consistently evolves. Our evolving self-
understanding both underlies and draws from the indeterminate and 
malleable nature of the terms “rights” and “revocation” in any given 
context. But judges and social movements generally cannot be agnostic 
as to what interests are legitimate legal rights—and where they 
determine that legitimate rights are involved, assuming for a moment the 
definition of right and revocation to be exogenously defined and fixed, 
they must attempt to remedy rights deprivation. A rights deprivation, 
understood as such, works violence, to a greater or lesser degree, in the 
conception of the individual. It alters her, changes her capability of 
functioning in a certain way, and may transform her in the eyes of the 
world, as well as, or, ultimately, in her own eyes, into something less than 
what she was. This affective and ontological link with the right never 
develops when the right is not previously endowed. 
Finally, institutional engagement in rights discourse reifies the 
power of rights language. But while institutions infuse rights language 
with power, they also draw power from rights language. The way they 
wield the language of rights affects their legitimacy and social situation. 
Institutions use their relationship with rights to define and describe 
themselves. Rights revocation arguments therefore play a role, not just in 
shaping the individuals who make them, but the very institutions that 
have the power to grant, deny, “revoke,” and “restore,” “rights.” 
 
 423. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
